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 “I Have a [Fair Use] Dream”: Historic 
Copyrighted Works and the Recognition 
of Meaningful Rights for the Public 
Arlen W. Langvardt* 
 
Dr. Martin Luther King wrote and delivered his famous “I Have a 
Dream” speech more than fifty years ago. When he obtained copyright 
protection on the speech in 1963, Dr. King (and later his estate) would 
have expected the copyright to last a maximum of fifty-six years. That 
fifty-six-year copyright has become a ninety-five-year copyright, thanks 
to lengthy duration extensions enacted by Congress in the mid-1970s and 
late 1990s. As a result, the copyright on the “I Have a Dream” speech 
will not expire until the end of 2058. 
Because the Estate of Martin Luther King, Jr., Inc. and its affili-
ates have closely guarded the speech in a copyright enforcement and li-
censing sense, the public seldom sees more than snippets of one of the most 
highly regarded speeches in history. Greater public exposure to the full 
speech would serve important purposes of the sort recognized by Congress 
in the fair use section of the Copyright Act. However, those interested in 
borrowing from or otherwise using the speech have tended to drop their 
plans or have obtained a costly license from the King Estate or one of the 
affiliated entities—even when the users may had have a plausible right 
under the fair use doctrine to borrow from or use the speech without ob-
taining a license. With the copyright on the speech not expiring until the 
end of 2058, there is a danger that the snippets-only nature of the pub-
lic’s exposure to the speech will remain the status quo for more than 
another four decades. 
                                                                                                                            
*  Professor of Business Law and Graf Family Professor, Kelley School of Business, 
Indiana University. The author acknowledges the helpful research assistance provided by 
Paul Lewellyn and Daniel Schiff. 
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Infringement cases that have not been settled by the parties have 
yielded judicial rulings on whether the “I Have a Dream” speech was 
properly copyrighted, but no case has been litigated extensively enough to 
permit a court to address the defendant’s fair use defense. This Article 
proposes a fair use analysis appropriate for use by courts in the event that 
a user of the “I Have a Dream” speech departs from the usual tendency 
to obtain a license in order to avoid litigation and, instead, rests its fate 
on the fair use doctrine. The proposed analysis gives a suitably expansive 
scope to the fair use doctrine for cases dealing with uses of the speech or 
similarly historic works, given the important public purposes that could 
be served by many such uses. The Article also develops a test for use in 
determining whether a work is sufficiently historic, for purposes of the 
fair use analysis proposed here. 
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INTRODUCTION 
More than fifty years have passed since Dr. Martin Luther 
King, Jr.’s “I Have a Dream” speech entered the national con-
sciousness. On August 28, 1963, a crowd estimated at 200,000 saw 
and heard Dr. King deliver the speech in our nation’s capital as 
part of the civil rights movement’s March on Washington events.1 
Millions more watched television broadcasts of the speech or lis-
tened to radio transmissions of it.2 Widely regarded as one of the 
greatest orations in modern times,3 “I Have a Dream”4 offered not 
                                                                                                                            
1 Estate of Martin Luther King, Jr., Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 194 F.3d 1211, 1213 (11th Cir. 
1999). At an event in Detroit two months earlier, Dr. King delivered a much shorter 
speech that contained some of the same words and ideas set forth in his later and 
considerably more well-known Washington, D.C. speech. The Detroit speech, which was 
untitled, included the “I have a dream” line. Martin Luther King, Jr. v. Mister Maestro, 
Inc., 224 F. Supp. 101, 103 (S.D.N.Y. 1963). 
2 CBS, 194 F.3d at 1213. 
3 See, e.g., Michiko Kakutani, The Lasting Power of Dr. King’s Dream Speech, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 27, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/28/us/the-lasting-power-of-
dr-kings-dream-speech.html; Valerie Strauss, ‘I Have a Dream’ speech still private property, 
WASH. POST, (Aug. 27, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/answer-sheet/
wp/2013/08/27/i-have-a-dream-speech-still-private-property. See also About Dr. King, 
THE KING CENTER, http://www.thekingcenter.org/about-dr-king (last visited Apr. 19, 
2015) (describing the reputation and impact of “I Have a Dream” speech in biographical 
section of Martin Luther King, Jr. Center for Nonviolent Social Change website). 
4 This Article frequently uses the “I Have a Dream” phrase or title to identify the 
copyrighted work consisting of Dr. King’s famous 1963 speech. Because the Article 
focuses on possible uses regarding the copyrighted speech, it makes no attempt to 
determine whether the King Estate should have trademark rights over the “I Have a 
Dream” phrase if the phrase is used in connection with something other than the famous 
speech itself. Although possible trademark issues are beyond the scope of the Article, it 
may be noted that the King Estate at one time had a federal trademark registration on the 
“I Have a Dream” phrase, for use in connection with a variety of products including such 
items as watches, ornamental pins, and t-shirts. Records of the US Patent and Trademark 
Office indicate that the trademark registration was abandoned in 1999. See U.S. Patent 
No. 75019950 (filed Nov. 8, 1995), I Have a Dream (abandonment date: June 29, 1999), 
http://tmsearch.uspto.gov/bin/showfield?f=doc&state=4808:8le9vr.2.1 
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only inspiration but also powerful insights that continue to resonate 
today. 
Given the historic importance of “I Have a Dream” and of Dr. 
King himself, the speech might seem to belong to the ages. In a le-
gal sense, however, it does not. Dr. King acquired copyright pro-
tection on the text of the speech in 1963.5 The copyright passed to 
his estate upon his assassination in 1968.6 Because the law in effect 
in 1963 contemplated a maximum of fifty-six years of copyright 
protection,7 the “I Have a Dream” copyright would have been set 
to expire at the end of 2019 if Congress had not changed the law. 
But Congress changed the law twice, enacting significant copyright 
duration extensions during the mid-1970s and late 1990s.8 As a re-
sult, the speech will remain under copyright protection through 
2058.9 The eventual expiration of the copyright will cause the 
speech to pass into the public domain and become available for 
whatever use anyone wishes to make of it.10 However, until that 
                                                                                                                            
5 Mister Maestro, 224 F. Supp. at 104–08. 
6 17 U.S.C. § 304 (2012). 
7 The then-applicable Copyright Act of 1909 called for a twenty-eight-year basic term 
plus a renewal term of twenty-eight years if the copyright owner took the necessary action 
to exercise the renewal right. Copyright Act of 1901, ch. 320, § 24, 35 Stat. 1075, 1080–81, 
amended by Copyright Act of 1976 (current version at 17 U.S.C. § 304 (2012). 
8 These extensions converted the renewal term that had been twenty-eight years into a 
sixty-seven-year renewal term. For explanation and discussion of the duration extensions, 
see infra Part I.C. 
9 As the fiftieth anniversary of Dr. King’s delivery of the “I Have a Dream” speech 
drew near, various news accounts and short commentaries pointed out that, to the 
possible surprise of the public, the speech was under copyright and would remain so for a 
significant number of years. See, e.g., Strauss, supra note 3; Josh Schiller, Why you won’t 
see or hear the “I have a dream” speech, WASH. POST, (Aug. 27, 2013), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/why-you-wont-see-or-hear-the-i-have-a-dre
am-speech/2013/08/27/09d2a07a-0e66-11e3-bdf6-e4fc677d94a1_story.html; Lauren 
Williams, I Have a Copyright: The Problem With MLK’s Speech, MOTHER JONES, Aug. 23, 
2013, http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2013/08/mlk-intellectual-property-prob
lems; Dustin Volz, Why MLK’s “Dream” Is So Hard to Find Online, NATIONAL JOURNAL, 
Aug. 19, 2013, http://www.nationaljournal.com/daily/why-mlk-s-dream-is-so-hard-to-
find-online-20130819; Alex Pasternack, Copyright King: Why the “I Have a Dream” Speech 
Still Isn’t Free, MOTHERBOARD, (Jan. 17, 2012), http://motherboard.vice.com/blog/
copyright-king-why-the-i-have-a-dream-speech-still-isn-t-free. The articles tended to 
recite the supposed fact that the copyright on the speech will run through 2038. See, e.g., 
Williams, supra; Volz, supra. However, as later explanation will reveal, that supposed 
time of expiration understates the actual time by twenty years. See infra Part I.C. 
10 E.g., Dastar v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 33–34 (2003). 
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public domain date finally arrives more than four decades from 
now, Dr. King’s estate can continue to exert control over the 
speech despite its considerable historical significance. 
Copyright owners’ rights, of course, are not of a monopoly na-
ture.11 Despite the general rule that infringement occurs when 
someone borrows a copyrighted work’s expression without the 
copyright owner’s permission, the fair use doctrine contemplates 
that those who engaged in unlicensed borrowing may sometimes 
avoid infringement liability.12 However, the case-by-case nature of 
the fair use doctrine leads to uncertainty about when it will or will 
not apply.13 Relying on fair use as a supposed justification for bor-
rowing from a copyrighted work can be an expensive proposition 
regardless of the case’s outcome, thanks to the time-consuming 
factor-based analysis in which the parties and the court must en-
gage when the fair use defense is invoked.14 Moreover, copyright 
owners often tend to be aggressive in enforcing their rights and in-
clined to ascribe a narrow scope to what they would consider fair 
use. The uncertainty associated with the fair use defense, coupled 
with a desire to avoid being sued, may cause would-be users of co-
pyrighted works to back off from borrowings that would be plausi-
ble candidates for fair use protection. Alternatively, such consider-
ations may influence users to borrow only small bits when more 
might have been justified, or to pay the copyright owner for a li-
cense when the application of fair use principles could have ob-
viated the need for the license.15 
                                                                                                                            
11 The statutory provision setting forth the rights of a copyright owner, 17 U.S.C. § 106 
(2012), provides that the rights are subject to various limitations set forth in §§ 107 
through 122. 
12 Id. §§ 107, 501. 
13 See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577 (1994); Harper & 
Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 560–61 (1985). 
14 See, e.g., Campbell, 510 U.S. at 578–94; Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 561–69. 
15 See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 585 n.18. See also Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use 
Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1107 (1990) (observing that “[c]onfusion [about fair 
use] has not been confined to judges” and that “[w]riters, historians, publishers and their 
legal advisers can only guess and pray as to how courts will resolve [fair use issues] in 
copyright disputes”). Judge Leval’s article has been influential in the development of fair 
use analysis—see infra note 239—but the case-by-case nature of the fair use doctrine 
continues to make outcomes in individual cases hard to predict. 
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Aggressive copyright enforcement practices appear to have had 
a chilling effect on possible uses of “I Have a Dream.” The King 
Estate’s enforcement stance features a general insistence on the 
need for a license if portions of the speech are to be used.16 Al-
though it has not been involved in much actual litigation regarding 
uses of the speech, the King Estate has demonstrated a clear wil-
lingness to sue if need be.17 Those interested in using the speech 
have tended to opt for a license in order to avoid litigation even 
though their particular uses might have been both desirable and 
justified under the fair use doctrine.18 As a result, when we see the 
speech quoted or video of portions of it aired, we see snippets. 
They may be memorable, but they are snippets nonetheless.19 The 
bits and pieces we do get to read, see, or hear would be even more 
educational and enlightening in the context of the full speech.20 
When courts have decided copyright infringement cases deal-
ing with unlicensed uses of “I Have a Dream,” the focus has been 
on a threshold question: whether the speech was validly copy-
righted or whether it had entered the public domain under certain 
copyright-disqualifying principles that were part of US copyright 
law at the time the speech was delivered. One court has concluded 
                                                                                                                            
16 See supra note 9. 
17 For discussion of the King Estate’s infringement lawsuits regarding the speech, see 
infra Part I.A. For discussion of other litigation dealing with the King Estate’s claims 
regarding other copyrighted works, items of personal property, or Dr. King’s public 
identity, see infra Part I.B. 
18 See Volz, supra note 9; Andrew Beaujon, MSNBC Licensed “I Have a Dream” Speech 
From King Family, POYNTER INST., (Aug. 29, 2013 9:07 AM), http://www.poy
nter.org/latest-news/mediawire/222446/msnbc-will-pay-king-family-to-air-i-have-a-
dream-speech-today/; Valerie Strauss, King’s Fiery Speech Rarely Heard, WASH. POST, 
Jan. 15, 2006, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/01/14/
AR2006011400980.html; see also Schiller, supra note 9 (asserting in newspaper op-ed that 
fair use protection should apply to certain unlicensed uses of Dr. King’s speech). Others 
potentially interested in using portions of Dr. King’s copyrighted works simply have 
given up on the idea. The producers of the recent movie Selma serve as an example. See 
infra text accompanying notes 122–24. 
19 Strauss, supra note 3; Strauss, King’s Fiery Speech Rarely Heard, supra note 18. 
20 See Williams, supra note 9; Volz, supra note 9; Strauss, King’s Fiery Speech Rarely 
Heard, supra note 18; see also Beaujon, supra note 18 (noting that MSNBC planned to 
show the entire speech but had paid a licensing fee to the King Estate); Derek Khanna, 
Guarding Against Abuse: The Costs of Excessively Long Copyright Terms, 23 COMMLAW 
CONSPECTUS 52, 76 (2014) (citing lengthy copyright duration as a reason why entire 
speech is seldom seen). 
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that copyright protection attached to the speech,21 and another 
court has at least strongly suggested that conclusion.22 Neither 
court, however, addressed possible fair use arguments that the de-
fendants might have had.23 
Hence, we do not know how courts would resolve the fair use 
question if users of significant portions of “I Have a Dream” de-
parted from the usual tendency to be cautious about provoking liti-
gation, refused to obtain a license from the King Estate, and in-
voked the fair use defense in the infringement lawsuit that would 
surely follow. We do know that in a roughly thirty-year-old deci-
sion, Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises,24 the Su-
preme Court stated that copyright law does not contemplate lesser 
rights for copyright owners whose works are of the “greatest im-
portance to the public.”25 As will be seen, however, Harper & Row 
differs significantly in a contextual sense from cases that might 
arise over the use of “I Have a Dream.” When Harper & Row is 
read in light of its context and with regard to later pronouncements 
by the Supreme Court, Harper & Row should not bar taking a 
work’s historic character into account as part of the factor-based 
fair use analysis.26 
                                                                                                                            
21 Martin Luther King, Jr. v. Mister Maestro, Inc., 224 F. Supp. 101, 108 (S.D.N.Y. 
1963). Discussion of the decision appears in Part I.A., infra. 
22 See Estate of Martin Luther King, Jr., Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 194 F.3d 1211, 1220 (11th 
Cir. 1999). In overturning a lower court’s grant of summary judgment to the defendant, 
the Eleventh Circuit determined that it could not conclude as a matter of law what the 
defendant wanted it to conclude: that copyright protection did not attach to the speech 
under the then-applicable legal rules. See id. The Eleventh Circuit did not grant summary 
judgment in favor of the plaintiff copyright owner, however—meaning that the court 
stopped short of ruling as a matter of law that copyright protection did attach. See id. 
Even so, the decision suggests that had the case proceeded to trial, there would likely 
have been a determination in favor of the plaintiff on the question of whether a valid 
copyright existed. See id. at 1214–20. For further discussion of the CBS decision and the 
legal rules governing whether the 1963 speech was validly copyrighted, see infra text 
accompanying notes 61–79. 
23 See infra note 60; infra text accompanying note 78. 
24 471 U.S. 539 (1985). 
25 Id. at 559. 
26 See infra text accompanying notes 286–93, 317–19. 
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Court decisions concerning the fair use defense are necessarily 
highly fact-specific.27 Even so, this Article asserts that under a 
proper fair use analysis, some users of “I Have a Dream” could be 
well-positioned to invoke the fair use defense successfully if they 
overcome the usual tendency to obtain a license in order to avoid 
litigation. In offering such an analysis, the Article emphasizes the 
public benefit associated with an expansive approach to fair use 
when historic works such as “I Have a Dream” are at issue.28 Due 
consideration of the public interest becomes especially important, 
as will be seen, because copyrights on such works now have a far 
longer duration than their owners expected to have under the law 
applicable when copyright protection arose.29 
Part I of the Article will deal with background concerning the 
“I Have a Dream” speech, the early litigation regarding unlicensed 
uses of it, the King Estate’s enforcement tendencies regarding the 
speech and other works of Dr. King, and the lengthy remaining du-
ration of the copyright on the speech. Part II will provide an over-
view of copyright law’s fair use doctrine and leading cases in which 
courts have decided whether the doctrine applies. Particular atten-
tion will be paid to the previously noted Harper & Row decision and 
to Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.,30 probably the most signifi-
cant of the Supreme Court’s fair use decisions. 
Building on the foundation laid in Parts I and II, Part III will 
furnish a detailed fair use analysis consistent with the above intro-
ductory remarks regarding potential uses of the “I Have a Dream” 
speech. In addition, Part III will consider other works of historic 
significance to which the proposed analysis should apply. 
                                                                                                                            
27 E.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577 (1994); Bill Graham 
Archives v. Dorling Kindersley, Ltd., 448 F.3d 605, 608 (2d Cir. 2006). 
28 See infra text accompanying notes 278–357. 
29 See infra text accompanying notes 126–51, 338–49. 
30 510 U.S. 569 (1994). 
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I. THE SPEECH: COPYRIGHT PROTECTION, 
ENFORCEMENT, AND DURATION  
A. Cases Deciding Whether the Speech Was Validly Copyrighted 
As would be expected, given the nature and purposes of the 
March on Washington, Dr. King and the organizers of the event 
hoped to attract considerable public attention to his August 28, 
1963 speech. They sought press coverage and received extensive 
amounts of it from print and broadcast outlets.31 Newspaper ac-
counts of the speech and televised footage of it enabled readers and 
viewers to get a sense of what the huge live crowd experienced: a 
major historical figure’s dynamic delivery of a profound, inspiring 
speech at a pivotal event in American history.32 
The significance of the “I Have a Dream” speech was not lost 
on entities that made prompt efforts to disseminate the speech 
widely despite having no affiliation with Dr. King or the March on 
Washington’s organizers.33 These efforts likely stemmed from a 
mixture of motives: a desire to inform and educate the public; a re-
lated interest in drawing attention to the cause of civil rights; and a 
recognition that it could be financially profitable to strike while the 
iron was hot.34 The New York Post, for instance, went beyond re-
porting on the speech and sold reprints of it after printing its entire 
text in a regular issue of the newspaper.35 Twentieth Century Fox 
Record Corporation (“Fox”) made video and audio recordings of 
Dr. King’s speech and other March on Washington speeches and 
used those recordings for a newsreel that was shown in movie thea-
ters. Fox also produced and sold a phonograph record of the 
speech.36 So did Mister Maestro, Inc., a media production and dis-
tribution company. These actions by Fox and Mister Maestro oc-
                                                                                                                            
31 Estate of Martin Luther King, Jr., Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 194 F.3d 1211, 1213 (11th Cir. 
1999); Martin Luther King, Jr. v. Mister Maestro, Inc., 224 F. Supp. 101, 103–04. 
(S.D.N.Y. 1963). 
32 See CBS, 194 F.3d at 1213; Mister Maestro, 224 F. Supp. at 103–04. 
33 See Mister Maestro, 224 F. Supp. at 104, 105, 108. 
34 See id. 
35 Id. at 104. 
36 Id. 
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curred without Dr. King’s consent, as did the Post’s sale of reprints 
of the speech’s text.37 
Some of the above-described actions prompted Dr. King to in-
stitute copyright infringement litigation, and before 1963 ended, a 
federal court had ruled in his favor. In King v. Mister Maestro, Inc.,38 
the court issued a preliminary injunction barring Mister Maestro 
and Fox from further distribution of their recordings of the “I 
Have a Dream” speech.39 The critical issue in the case was wheth-
er Dr. King held a valid copyright on his speech.40 
If today’s copyright law had applied to the speech, the “Was 
there a valid copyright?” question would have been easy to answer 
because copyright protection would have arisen automatically un-
der federal law once the speech was created and fixed in a tangible 
medium of expression.41 As of 1963, however, determining whether 
copyright protection had been acquired was a very different inquiry 
that depended heavily on whether the work was published or un-
published.42 The law in effect at that time contemplated the exis-
tence of a common-law copyright in favor of the work’s creator if 
the work remained unpublished.43 Under the then-applicable Cop-
yright Act of 1909, a statutory copyright was available if, prior to 
publication of the work, the creator complied with statutory re-
quirements to furnish a copy to the US Copyright Office and ob-
tained a certificate of registration.44 If a general publication of the 
                                                                                                                            
37 Id. 
38 224 F. Supp. 101 (S.D.N.Y. 1963). 
39 Id. at 108. Dr. King did not sue the New York Post despite its sale of reprints of the 
speech. See id. at 104–05. 
40 See id. at 104–07. 
41 17 U.S.C. §§ 102, 201, 302 (2012). 
42 See Mister Maestro, 224 F. Supp. at 105. 
43 See Estate of Martin Luther King, Jr., Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 194 F.3d 1211, 1214 (11th Cir. 
1999); Mister Maestro, 224 F. Supp. at 105. 
44 See Copyright Act of 1909, 17 U.S.C. §§ 10–13 (superseded sections applicable to 
pre-1978 works); see also CBS, 194 F.3d at 1214 (discussing statutory requirements for 
securing copyright on pre-1978 works); Mister Maestro, 224 F. Supp. at 105 (to same 
effect). Alternatively, the Copyright Act of 1909 provided that a statutory copyright 
regarding a performed work was available if any published copies of the work bore a 
proper copyright notice and the creator promptly furnished copies to the Copyright 
Office. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 10–13 (superseded sections applicable to pre-1978 works); see also 
CBS, 194 F.3d at 1222 (Cook, Senior District Judge, sitting by designation, concurring in 
2015] "I HAVE A [FAIR USE] DREAM" 949 
 
work occurred without satisfaction of the statutory requirements, 
the work would enter the public domain because the common law 
copyright would have expired and no statutory copyright would 
have arisen.45 
A month and two days after he delivered the speech, Dr. King 
sent the US Copyright Office a copy of the “I Have a Dream” text 
and applied for a certificate of registration.46 He premised his claim 
to copyright protection on the notion that the speech was an un-
published work in the Class C category of “lectures, sermons, [or] 
addresses (prepared for oral delivery).”47 The Copyright Office 
soon issued the requested certificate.48 When Dr. King sought a 
preliminary injunction, the Mister Maestro defendants argued that 
in light of the circumstances surrounding its delivery, the speech 
was a published work as of August 28, 1963.49 Accordingly, the de-
fendants maintained, the speech entered the public domain that 
day—making it available for all to use for whatever purpose—
because Dr. King had not complied with the statutory require-
ments for securing copyright protection on published works.50 
In arguing that “I Have a Dream” became a published work the 
day Dr. King gave the speech, the Mister Maestro defendants fo-
cused on the following reasons: the active efforts by Dr. King and 
                                                                                                                            
part and dissenting in part) (discussing alternative route to satisfaction of statutory 
requirements for securing copyright on pre-1978 works). 
45 CBS, 194 F.3d at 1214–15; Mister Maestro, 224 F. Supp. at 105–06. To lessen the 
potential harshness of the rule that copyright protection would be lost if publication of the 
work occurred without satisfaction of the requirements for a statutory copyright, courts 
developed a distinction between a general publication and a limited publication. Only a 
general publication could cause a loss of copyright protection if the formalities for a 
statutory copyright had not been satisfied. CBS, 194 F.3d at 1214; Mister Maestro, 224 F. 
Supp. at 106. 
46 Mister Maestro, 224 F. Supp. at 104. 
47 Id. 
48 Id. at 104–05. After the issuance of this certificate of registration, Dr. King 
authorized the publication of “I Have a Dream” in books or similar printed materials that 
bore a copyright notice. He then sent copies of the published materials to the Copyright 
Office and obtained a copyright registration in a category reserved for published books. Id. 
at 105. 
49 See Mister Maestro, 224 F. Supp. at 106. 
50 Id. at 106–07. The defendants, therefore, were asserting that Dr. King’s late-
September efforts to obtain a statutory copyright—see id. at 104–05—were too late and 
should not have been given any legal effect. See id. at 106. 
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the organizers of the March on Washington to obtain extensive 
press coverage (efforts that clearly bore fruit); the furnishing of 
mimeographed copies of the speech to the press tent shortly before 
he delivered the speech (copies that presumably had no copyright 
notice on them); and the fact that the speech, by design, was deli-
vered to a huge audience consisting of members of the public.51 
The court rejected the defendants’ argument, however.52 In doing 
so, the court pointed out that the copies furnished to the press tent 
were for the limited purpose of helping reporters follow the speech 
in their media coverage efforts.53 The court also noted that Dr. 
King authorized the release of copies only to the press, not to the 
general public. Thus, the court reasoned, there was no general pub-
lication in the necessary sense of dedicating the work to the pub-
lic.54 
Neither did a general publication result, according to the court, 
from the delivery of the speech to a vast public audience.55 The 
court cited statutory authority and supporting cases indicating that 
the oral delivery of an address and the public performance of simi-
lar works—even when there was a large audience—did not consti-
tute a general publication of the work for purposes of the then-
applicable rules concerning copyright maintenance or acquisition.56 
Hence, the court concluded, “I Have a Dream” was an unpub-
lished work on August 28, 1963 and remained so as of the time Dr. 
King took the necessary steps to obtain a statutory copyright in late 
September of that same year.57 
After determining that Dr. King possessed a valid copyright on 
the speech, the court briefly considered whether the defendants’ 
actions would likely cause irreparable harm. The court noted that 
Dr. King “has made, or is making, arrangements to market phono-
                                                                                                                            
51 Id. at 106–07. 
52 Id. at 106–08. 
53 Id. at 103. 
54 Id. at 107–08. 
55 Id. at 106–07. 
56 Id. However, even if Dr. King’s delivery of the speech did not constitute a general 
publication under the former rules on copyright maintenance or acquisition, the 
circumstances surrounding the speech remain highly relevant for purposes of the fair use 
analysis offered later in this Article. See infra text accompanying notes 284–87. 
57 Mister Maestro, 224 F. Supp. at 104–05, 106–08. 
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graph records of his speech through an organization of his own 
choosing, the profits from which … are intended to be used … in 
whole or in part to aid the causes with which he is identified.”58 
The records produced and sold by the defendants would be 
“[c]ompetition” and would “seem clearly to show danger of an 
irreparable injury.”59 The court therefore issued the preliminary 
injunction.60 The ruling effectively ended the case, with the lack of 
other reported proceedings suggesting that the defendants chose 
not to contest the plaintiff’s claim any further. 
After the Mister Maestro court ruled that “I Have a Dream” 
was validly copyrighted, parties subsequently wishing to make uses 
of the speech tended to accept the notion that a license from the 
copyright owner would be necessary.61 However, the CBS televi-
sion network viewed the matter differently when it made prepara-
tions to produce and air a documentary series roughly thirty years 
after Dr. King’s delivery of the historic speech. One segment in the 
series titled “The 20th Century with Mike Wallace” was devoted 
to Dr. King and the March on Washington.62 In that segment, CBS 
used considerable footage that the network had filmed during the 
March on Washington as well as footage that the network had 
filmed of Dr. King’s delivery of “I Have a Dream.”63 Although the 
latter footage included approximately sixty percent of the content 
                                                                                                                            
58 Id. at 108. 
59 Id. 
60 Id. The Mister Maestro court did not devote analytical attention to whether the 
defendants might have had a fair use defense, probably because of the procedural posture 
of the case and the defendants’ emphasis on the whether the speech was even entitled to 
copyright protection. See id. at 106–07. Had the case gone to trial, it seems likely that the 
defendants would have tried to argue fair use. In its brief attention to the irreparable harm 
issue, the Mister Maestro court did refer to the defendants’ actions as “unfair.” Id. at 108. 
However, the court attached the “unfair” label almost in passing, without conducting the 
painstaking factor-based analysis in which courts must engage when the fair use defense is 
involved. See id. For discussion of the fair use factors and the nature of fair use analysis, 
see infra Part II.A. Importantly, too, even if a full fair use analysis would have resulted in a 
conclusion that the defendants’ sale of recordings of the speech was not protected by the 
fair use doctrine, such an outcome would not mean that other users of the “I Have a 
Dream” speech would necessarily be barred from successfully invoking the fair use 
defense. For this Article’s proposals regarding a fair use analysis, see infra Part III. 
61 See Estate of Martin Luther King, Jr., Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 194 F.3d 1211, 1213 (11th Cir. 
1999). 
62 See id. 
63 Id. 
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of the speech, CBS neither sought a license from the King Estate 
nor offered to pay royalties to it.64 The Estate responded by suing 
CBS for copyright infringement.65 
Disagreeing with the conclusion reached approximately thirty-
five years earlier in Mister Maestro, a federal district court held that 
no valid copyright existed with regard to Dr. King’s speech and 
that CBS therefore was entitled to summary judgment.66 The dis-
trict court concluded that Dr. King’s “performance [of the speech] 
coupled with such wide and unlimited reproduction and dissemina-
tion as occurred concomitant to Dr. King’s speech during the 
March on Washington can be seen only as a general publication 
which thrust the speech into the public domain.”67 However, in 
Estate of Martin Luther King, Jr., Inc. v. CBS, Inc.,68 the US Court 
of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed the grant of summary 
judgment to CBS and remanded the case to the district court.69 
The parties then settled the case,70 and no further proceedings oc-
curred. 
The Eleventh Circuit emphasized that in reaching its decision, 
it considered only the undisputed facts in the case.71 Those facts 
concerned Dr. King’s delivery of the speech in front of a huge au-
dience, the furnishing of copies of the speech to the press tent, and 
the efforts of Dr. King and the March on Washington organizers to 
                                                                                                                            
64 Id. 
65 Id. The material filmed by CBS and used in the documentary may well have been a 
copyrighted work in its own right, with CBS owning the copyright on the footage even 
though the words of Dr. King’s speech belonged to the Estate as a copyright matter. At 
the very least, the footage was potentially copyrightable under the then-existing statutory 
requirements for securing copyright protection. See supra text accompanying notes 43–45. 
In addition, CBS’s filming of Dr. King’s speech was an action of the sort that Dr. King 
and the March on Washington organizers welcomed and invited as part of their attempts 
to have the speech made available beyond those persons actually in attendance. See CBS, 
194 F.3d at 1224; Mister Maestro, 224 F. Supp. at 103–04, 106. 
66 Estate of Martin Luther King, Jr., Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 13 F. Supp. 2d 1347, 1354 (N.D. 
Ga. 1998), rev’d, 194 F.3d 1211 (11th Cir. 1999); see also Mister Maestro, 224 F. Supp. at 
108. The relevant rules regarding acquisition and maintenance of copyright as of 1963 are 
set forth at supra text accompanying notes 43–45. 
67 CBS, 13 F. Supp. 2d at 1351, 1354. 
68 194 F.3d 1211 (11th Cir. 1999). 
69 Id. at 1220. 
70 Volz, supra note 9. 
71 See Estate of Martin Luther King, Jr., Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 194 F.3d 1211, 1217 n.4. 
2015] "I HAVE A [FAIR USE] DREAM" 953 
 
obtain extensive press coverage (including live broadcasts) of the 
speech.72 The court viewed the undisputed facts in light of com-
mon-law authority indicating that a general publication does not 
result from the furnishing of copies of the work on only a limited 
basis or from performance of the work, regardless of the size of the 
audience.73 Therefore, the court reasoned, it could not conclude 
that a copyright-disqualifying publication of the speech occurred as 
a matter of law on August 28, 1963.74 This meant that the grant of 
summary judgment to CBS could not stand.75 
Although it was not considering disputed matters of supposed 
fact in its review of the grant of summary judgment, the Eleventh 
Circuit noted certain disputed matters that might lead the lower 
court to conclude that a general publication occurred if the court, 
on remand, resolved those fact questions in CBS’s favor.76 The 
disputed matters were: whether the speech’s full text appeared in a 
widely circulated newsletter of the Southern Christian Leadership 
Council around the time of the speech, and, if so, whether Dr. King 
had authorized that action; and whether the copies of the speech 
furnished to the press tent had also been made freely available to 
members of the public with Dr. King’s authorization.77 
It is important to note a further set of issues that the Eleventh 
Circuit did not address in its CBS decision because they were 
beyond the scope of the motion for summary judgment. The appel-
late court stated that it “would be inappropriate for us to address 
CBS’s other arguments, e.g., fair use and the First Amendment, 
because the district court did not address them, and because the 
                                                                                                                            
72 See id. 
73 See id. 
74 Id. at 1214–17, 1220. Of course, the Eleventh Circuit was ruling on the publication 
issue against the backdrop of the copyright acquisition and maintenance rules that applied 
as of 1963. See id. at 1214, 1226–27 (Cook, Senior District Judge, sitting by designation, 
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (concurring in the result); see also supra text 
accompanying notes 43–45 (summarizing those rules). 
75 CBS, 194 F.3d at 1216–17, 1220. The court’s decision did not establish, however, 
that the King Estate was entitled to summary judgment. The Eleventh Circuit was not 
holding as a matter of law that a general publication did not occur. Rather, the court held 
only that the undisputed facts did not warrant a conclusion that a general publication took 
place. Id. at 1216–17, 1219–20. 
76 See id. 1219–20. 
77 Id. at 1217; see also id. at 1219–20. 
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relevant facts may not yet be fully developed.”78 This Article, of 
course, will later take up the fair use issues the Eleventh Circuit did 
not have occasion to address in CBS and will offer a fair use analy-
sis of relevance to a range of possible unlicensed uses of the “I 
Have a Dream” speech.79 
B. The King Estate’s Licensing Practices Regarding “I Have a 
Dream” and Other Works 
Three entities established after Dr. King’s death play key roles 
in copyright enforcement and licensing regarding the “I Have a 
Dream” speech. One is the Estate of Martin Luther King., Jr., Inc., 
the plaintiff in the CBS case.80 Dr. and Mrs. King’s three children 
play key roles in leading this corporate entity.81 In addition, the 
King family established Intellectual Properties Management, Inc., a 
firm that handles a range of licensing matters regarding the “I 
Have a Dream” speech, other copyrighted works of Dr. King, and 
                                                                                                                            
78 Id. at 1220 (emphasis added). The court also pointed out that it was “express[ing] no 
opinion on the eventual merits of this litigation.” Id. 
79 See infra Part III. Of course, if unlicensed uses of the sort to be discussed later in the 
Article caused the King Estate to file infringement lawsuits, the defendants would not be 
restricted to offering fair use arguments. They could also make the same sorts of 
arguments made by the defendants in CBS and Mister Maestro regarding a supposed 
general publication of the speech on Aug. 28, 1963 and a resulting entry of the speech into 
the public domain as of that date. Neither CBS nor Mister Maestro would be a completely 
unassailable precedent blocking the defendants, given the respective postures of those 
cases (appeal of a summary judgment for the defendant in CBS, and motion for a 
preliminary injunction in Mister Maestro). See supra text accompanying notes 51–54, 61–
70. Nevertheless, the odds would seem to be against a defendant’s renewed argument 
that a copyright-disqualifying general publication of the speech occurred on the day Dr. 
King delivered it more than fifty years ago. This Article, therefore, assumes without 
further argument that the copyright on the “I Have a Dream” speech is not vulnerable to 
an attack on its validity. The Article will focus instead on the development of a sensible 
fair use analysis for use in cases involving unlicensed uses of the copyrighted speech or 
similar historic works. See infra Part III. 
80 CBS, 194 F.3d at 1211. 
81 A recent report indicated that Dexter King, one of the three children of Dr. and Mrs. 
King, is the president and chief executive officer of the estate and that his brother, Martin 
Luther King III, is chairman of the board. The Associated Press, Georgia: Dr. King’s 
Children End One Suit Over Legacy, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 2015, at A5. Both brothers and 
presumably their sister, Bernice King, are board members. David Beasley, Martin Luther 
King’s Sons Dismiss Licensing Lawsuit Against King Center, HUFFINGTON POST, (Jan. 23, 
2015), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/01/23/mlk-children-lawsuit-drop_n_6533
690.html. 
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Dr. King’s right of publicity.82 A family member also heads up this 
firm.83 The Martin Luther King, Jr. Center for Nonviolent Social 
Change (the “King Center”) is the third entity. The King family 
established this not-for-profit organization, whose museum com-
memorates Dr. King’s life and accomplishments and whose pro-
grams are meant to heighten public awareness and understanding 
of causes with which he was associated.84 Through its archives, the 
King Center permits access to some works of Dr. King, but makes 
clear that further uses of copyrighted material will require a license. 
As the King Center website indicates, Intellectual Properties Man-
agement handles licensing matters for the Center.85 
Access to the “I Have a Dream” speech is not available 
through the King Center’s archives, though the Center does sell 
DVDs of the speech for approximately twenty dollars each.86 How-
ever, copyright law contemplates that the purchaser of a DVD ac-
quires only the object itself and the right to view what is on the 
DVD.87 The purchaser acquires no right to use the DVD’s copy-
                                                                                                                            
82 Williams, supra note 9. For instance, in response to an inquiry about possible 
licensing arrangements for use of portions of the “I Have a Dream” speech in a 
hypothetical documentary, Intellectual Properties Management responded with an email 
that attached a five-page “Intellectual Property Request Form” prior to any licensing 
decision. The signature block indicated that the reply email was sent by a “Licensing 
Coordinator, Intellectual Properties Management (IPM), Licensing Manager of the 
Estate of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.” Email from Paul Lewellyn to Intellectual 
Properties Management, Jan. 14, 2015; email from Sandra Butler to Paul Lewellyn, Jan. 
15, 2015, with attachment (emails and attachment on file with author). 
83 Dexter King is the family member, according to a report. Charles E. Cobb, The 
Shakedown at the King Monument, THE ROOT, (Sept. 6, 2011), http://www.theroot.com/
views/shakedown-king-monument. 
84 About the King Center, THE KING CENTER, http://www.thekingcenter.org/about-
king-center (last visited Apr. 19, 2015). Martin Luther King III has served as president of 
the Center. Pasternack, supra note 9. Bernice is the Center’s CEO. Beasley, supra note 81. 
85 About the King Center, supra note 84; see also Archives Terms & Conditions, THE KING 
CENTER, http://www.thekingcenter.org/archive-terms-conditions (last visited Apr. 15, 
2015). 
86 Schiller, supra note 9; Strauss, supra note 3. Although the text of the speech is not 
available through the King Center’s archives, one may find a copy in the collection of the 
National Archives at www.archives.gov/press/exhibits/dream-speech.pdf. 
87 See 17 U.S.C. § 202 (2012) (“Ownership of a copyright, or of any of the exclusive 
rights under a copyright, is distinct from ownership of any material object in which the 
work is embodied.  Transfer of ownership of any material object, including the copy or 
phonorecord in which the work is first fixed, does not of itself convey any rights in the 
copyrighted work embodied in the object . . . .”); see also id. § 109 (“[T]he owner of a 
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righted content in any way that would be considered a public per-
formance and no right to make any other use of the copyrighted 
speech—unless, of course, Intellectual Properties Management or 
the King Estate licenses that specific use or the fair use doctrine 
would permit it.88 
Other entities affiliated only contractually with the King Estate 
are also involved in enforcing copyrights on Dr. King’s works and 
in deciding whether to grant licenses for uses of them. Under a 
2011 agreement with the King Estate, EMI—the British music pub-
lishing and recording conglomerate—took on copyright enforce-
ment and licensing responsibilities regarding some of Dr. King’s 
works.89 In addition, literary agency Writers House plays a role in 
the issuance or non-issuance of licenses for uses of certain King 
works.90 
The lines between the respective roles of the King Estate, Intel-
lectual Properties Management, the King Center, EMI, and Writ-
ers House in copyright enforcement and licensing are less than 
clear, but clear delineation of those respective roles is not necessary 
for the purposes of this Article. Rather, the key consideration here 
is a more general point: that copyright enforcement and licensing 
regarding Dr. King’s works is a well-established, structured opera-
tion in which a number of licensing entities and agents participate. 
Given the relationships between and among the various entities 
referred to above, this Article’s further discussion and analysis of 
enforcement and licensing decisions and actions regarding Dr. 
                                                                                                                            
particular copy or phonorecord lawfully made under this title … is entitled, without the 
authority of the copyright owner, to sell or otherwise dispose of the possession of that 
copy or phonorecord.”). 
88 See id. § 106. Similarly, one who finds the speech in the collection of the National 
Archives, see supra note 74, is entitled to read the speech but is not free to make other 
uses of the speech’s content unless the copyright owner grants a license or the fair use 
doctrine applies. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 106, 107. This Article will propose a relevant fair use 
analysis. See infra Part III. 
89 Williams, supra note 9; Pasternack, supra note 9. The arrangement may include a 
partial ownership interest on the part of EMI with regard to the copyright on the “I Have 
a Dream” speech. Id.; Strauss, supra note 3. 
90 See Estate Representation, WRITERS HOUSE, http://www.writershouse.com/content/
independent/asp (last visited May 14, 2015). The Writers House website states that the 
firm “handles permissions and licenses for the literary estate of Dr. Martin Luther King, 
Jr.” Id. 
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King’s works will normally refer to the King Estate as making those 
decisions or taking those actions. Such references will be made for 
convenience purposes, regardless of whether the Estate itself, In-
tellectual Properties Management, the King Center, EMI, or Writ-
ers House made the decision or took the action in question. 
Although the previously discussed Mister Maestro and CBS cas-
es91 are the only reported judicial opinions concerning alleged in-
fringement of the copyright on the “I Have a Dream” speech, the 
King Estate has been involved in other disputes regarding unli-
censed uses of the speech. For instance, the Estate alleged that 
USA Today committed infringement when, without a license, it 
printed the text of the speech in an edition of the newspaper 
around the time of an anniversary of Dr. King’s delivery of “I Have 
a Dream.”92 The dispute was settled by the parties under terms 
that involved payment by USA Today.93 Similarly, the Estate in-
sisted on payment from CNN for the right to air the speech.94 
Eyes on the Prize, a widely praised documentary on the civil 
rights movement, triggered objections by the King Estate to an un-
licensed inclusion of portions of the “I Have a Dream” speech. A 
dispute over whether a licensing fee was owed and the apparent 
inability of the Estate and the documentary’s producers to reach a 
settlement led to a stalemate in which the documentary was effec-
tively out of circulation for a number of years.95 Eventually, the 
Public Broadcasting Service stepped in and facilitated an arrange-
ment under which the documentary could again be aired and distri-
buted.96 
Although the King Estate has drawn criticism for taking en-
forcement action regarding certain unlicensed uses of part or all of 
                                                                                                                            
91 For discussion of those cases, see supra Part I.A. 
92 Pasternack, supra note 9. 
93 Id. 
94 See Richard Fausset, An Unsettled Chapter in Martin Luther King’s Legacy, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 12, 2015, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/13/us/fate-of-mar
tin-luther-kings-bible-may-be-clearer-after-ruling-.html?emc=etal; Jason Linkins, Here’s 
Why You Don’t See MLK’s ‘I Have a Dream’ Speech All the Time, HUFFINGTON POST, 
(Aug. 28, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/08/28/i-have-a-dream-copyright
_n_3829901.html. 
95 Williams, supra note 9; Pasternack, supra note 9. 
96 Williams, supra note 9. 
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“I Have a Dream,”97 the Estate has responded by stating that it has 
permitted various unlicensed uses for educational purposes—
presumably in school settings for the most part.98 However, uses 
that have a significant educational character are not necessarily 
confined to the school setting. As the Eyes on the Prize dispute sug-
gests, the King Estate may be inclined to take a dim view of certain 
unlicensed uses even when they have a significant educational (or 
similarly important) purpose underlying them.99 
Representatives of the King family have noted that Dr. King’s 
vocation and leadership in advancing important social causes did 
not lead to significant income during his lifetime.100 The King fami-
ly faced financial challenges after his death.101 Copyright enforce-
ment thus provided a source of income for the surviving family 
members.102 Importantly, too, licensing revenue has not simply 
gone to the family but has also been used for the advancement of 
causes with which Dr. King was identified.103 
Of course, it is not unusual for copyright owners to be aggres-
sive in seeking to enforce the rights federal law grants them and to 
adopt a less-than-expansive view of what the fair use doctrine 
might permit.104 In those respects, the King Estate may be a typical 
copyright owner. But even if the Estate is a typical copyright owner 
                                                                                                                            
97 Id.; Pasternack, supra note 9; Schiller, supra note 9; Strauss, supra note 3. The Estate 
has also drawn criticism for certain decisions to grant licenses instead of saying “no.” See 
Pasternack, supra note 9 (noting civil rights leader Julian Bond’s negative reaction to 
seeing an Alcatel television commercial that used portions of the speech under a license 
granted by the Estate). 
98 Strauss, supra note 3; see Strauss, King’s Fiery Speech Rarely Heard, supra note 18. Of 
course, many such uses could go undetected by the Estate. See id. The case for fair use 
treatment in the school setting, moreover, is very strong. See infra Part III.A.3. In 
addition, some uses in the school context could be justified under the separate statutory 
privilege that permits instructors to “[perform] or display” a copyrighted work “in the 
course of face-to-face teaching activities of a nonprofit educational institution, in a 
classroom or similar place devoted to instruction.” 17 U.S.C. § 110 (2012). 
99 See Pasternack, supra note 9; Williams, supra note 9. 
100 See Williams, supra note 9. 
101 Strauss, King’s Fiery Speech Rarely Heard, supra note 18. 
102 Id.; see also Pasternack, supra note 9; Williams, supra note 9. 
103 Pasternack, supra note 9. 
104 The point is illustrated by the large number of copyright infringement cases in which 
the defendant argues for fair use protection but the plaintiff, obviously, regards the 
doctrine as inapplicable to the defendant’s use. 
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in terms of its licensing and enforcement efforts, the copyrighted 
work serving as the main object of those efforts is anything but typ-
ical.105 
Although the “I Have a Dream” speech’s legacy would seem 
to give it the highest profile of any of Dr. King’s copyrighted 
works, the King Estate maintains an active licensing and enforce-
ment policy regarding his other works.106 The Estate has also in-
itiated litigation in which it contested ownership claims made by 
others regarding personal property items that Dr. King supposedly 
had given to them. For example, the Estate unsuccessfully sued 
Boston University in an effort to obtain the return of papers that 
Dr. King had deposited with the school beginning in 1964.107 In a 
similar but more recent case, the Estate failed to obtain the return 
of documents and other items that, the defendant contended, had 
been gifts from Dr. King.108 Even more recently, the Estate became 
                                                                                                                            
105 See infra Part III.A.3 (discussing the unique importance of “I Have a Dream”). 
106 See supra Part I.A. 
107 King v. Trustees of Boston Univ., 647 N.E.2d 1196, 1198 (Mass. 1995). The Estate 
contended that it owned the papers and that the university committed conversion by 
refusing to return the papers and maintaining them in a collection at the university library. 
Id. at 1198–99. This was a case about rights over the objects (the papers), not a case of 
alleged infringement of any copyright that may have existed in the expressive content of 
the papers. See id. A key piece of evidence was a 1964 letter in which Dr. King outlined a 
plan to provide the university (where he received his doctorate) with documents that 
would become the university’s property. Id. Responding to questions in a special verdict 
form, the jury determined that Dr. King had made a charitable pledge on which Boston 
University relied, that Dr. King had delivered documents contemplated by the pledge, 
and that the university therefore owned the documents. Id. at 1199–1200. On appeal, the 
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts upheld the jury’s verdict in favor of the 
university. Id. at 1200–04. 
108 Estate of Martin Luther King, Jr., Inc. v. Ballou, 544 Fed. App’x 280, 284 (5th Cir. 
2013). The defendant was the son of Dr. King’s former secretary, who also had been a 
friend of Dr. and Mrs. King. When she ceased working for Dr. King in 1960, the 
defendant’s mother retained possession of documents and other items that she regarded 
as gifts from Dr. King. Id. The personal property at issue later came into the possession of 
her son, who became the defendant in a conversion and replevin case filed by the King 
Estate roughly forty years after his mother left Dr. King’s employ. Id. at 281. A federal 
district court granted the defendant summary judgment on two alternative grounds. Id. at 
282. First, the court concluded that if conversion occurred, it would have occurred in 
1960, when the defendant’s mother left her job with Dr. King and retained possession of 
the documents and other items. Id. This meant that the statute of limitations had expired 
many years before the King Estate filed suit. See id. Second, the court concluded that 
rather than establishing conversion, the evidence indicated that Dr. King made a 
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involved in a personal-property dispute with famous singer Harry 
Belafonte, who had been a close friend of Dr. King and had worked 
with him in the civil rights movement.109 Belafonte maintained that 
certain items in his possession for many years had been gifts from 
Dr. and Mrs. King, but the Estate contested his claim of owner-
ship.110 The parties later settled the case on terms that were largely 
confidential, but with Belafonte retaining possession—and pre-
sumably ownership—of the items.111 
Besides pursuing claims for copyright infringement and sup-
posed conversion of personal property items, the King Estate and 
the King Center have sought to enforce Dr. King’s right of publici-
ty.112 In Martin Luther King, Jr. Center for Social Change, Inc. v. 
                                                                                                                            
completed gift to the defendant’s mother and that the defendant owned the property at 
issue through a gift from his mother. Id. at 281–82. The US Court of Appeals for the Fifth 
Circuit affirmed on the basis of the statute-of-limitations ground and therefore found it 
unnecessary to address the alternative ground of a completed gift. Id. at 282–84 n.3. 
109 James C. McKinley, Jr., Belafonte Sues Heirs of Martin Luther King, Jr., N.Y. TIMES, 
Oct. 15, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/16/arts/belafonte-sues-the-king-
family.html. During the 1960s, Dr. King frequently stayed in Belafonte’s New York 
apartment and held meetings there with advisers. Id. 
110 Id. The items included an outline for a later-drafted 1967 speech by Dr. King on the 
Vietnam War and a letter of condolence from President Johnson to Mrs. King after Dr. 
King’s assassination. Id. Belafonte also had another item that had been the subject of a 
bequest to him in the will of one of Dr. King’s longtime aides: an envelope that was in Dr. 
King’s pocket on the day he was assassinated. Notes for a speech Dr. King was to deliver 
in Memphis appeared on the envelope. Id. Belafonte had planned to sell these items in an 
auction and devote the proceeds to a charitable organization that works with street gangs. 
However, the King Estate intervened, alleging that it owned the items and that Belafonte 
had wrongfully acquired them. As a result, Sotheby’s (the auction house that was to 
handle the sale) held on to the items pending a resolution of the parties’ competing claims 
of ownership. Belafonte then instituted a declaratory judgment action against the Estate. 
Id. Sotheby’s was the firm the King family and the King Center intended to use several 
years ago for the sale of some 10,000 of Dr. King’s speeches, sermons, letters, and other 
documents. Id. The auction did not occur, however, because the City of Atlanta stepped 
in and purchased the collection for approximately $32 million. Id. 
111 Dareh Gregorian, Harry Belafonte and Estate of Martin Luther King, Jr. Reach Deal 
Declaring Singer Rightful Owner of King’s Documents, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, April 11, 2014, 
http://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/harry-belafonte-estate-martin-luther-king-
jr-reach-deal-docs-article-1.1753604. 
112 The right of publicity entitles a celebrity (or, in many states, the estate of a deceased 
celebrity) to seek damage awards and injunctive relief against defendants who made a 
commercial use of the celebrity’s name, likeness, or identity without the consent of the 
celebrity or his estate. See Tara E. Langvardt, Reinforcing the Commercial–Noncommercial 
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American Heritage Products, Inc.,113 the Supreme Court of Georgia 
answered a federal court’s certified questions concerning a case in 
which the King Center and the King Estate sought remedies 
against a defendant that was producing and selling plastic busts of 
Dr. King.114 The Georgia court stated that Georgia law recognizes 
the right of publicity in favor of public figures such as Dr. King and 
that such a right survives the public figure’s death.115 The court 
also noted that a for-profit use of the sort present in the case ap-
peared sufficiently commercial to support a right of publicity claim, 
but suggested that not all unlicensed uses of the celebrity’s name, 
likeness, or identity would justify a claim.116 
Dr. King’s supposed right of publicity and a concern about use 
of words and phrases from some of his writings or speeches appar-
ently motivated Intellectual Properties Management, Inc. (the pre-
viously noted licensing agent for the King Estate and King Cen-
ter117) to seek a licensing fee from the builder of the memorial to 
Dr. King that now appears on the National Mall in Washington, 
D.C. Intellectual Properties Management negotiated the builder’s 
payment of a licensing fee that reportedly exceeded $700,000.118 
The fee ostensibly was meant to make up for possible donations 
that the King Center might lose, on the theory that those who do-
nated for purposes of the memorial would not then donate to the 
King Center.119 
Considering the King Estate’s and King Center’s active copy-
right enforcement and licensing operation,120 their history of filing 
                                                                                                                            
Distinction: A Framework for Accommodating First Amendment Interests in the Right of 
Publicity, 13 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 167, 169 (2014). 
113 296 S.E.2d 697 (Ga. 1982). 
114 Id. at 698–99. 
115 Id. at 700–05. 
116 See id. at 702, 705; see also id. at 708–09 (Weltner, J., concurring specially) 
(suggesting that not all uses that involve financial gain are sufficiently commercial to give 
rise to right of publicity claim). 
117 See supra text accompanying note 82. 
118 Cobb, supra note 83. 
119 Id. 
120 Disagreements among King family members and some of the previously noted King-
related entities have also led to litigation. Fausset, supra note 94. The King Estate, on 
whose board Dexter King and Martin Luther King III form a majority), sued the King 
Center, which is headed up by Bernice King. Id. The lawsuit pertained to control of Dr. 
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of copyright infringement, conversion of personal property, and 
right of publicity lawsuits, and the prospect of such litigation if a 
party were to make an unlicensed use of supposedly protected ma-
terial, it is not surprising that would-be users of the “I Have a 
Dream” speech have tended to obtain a license or not make the use 
at all.121 The recent movie Selma furnishes an example of not mak-
ing the use at all. One might assume that in a movie about the 1965 
march Dr. King led from Selma, Alabama to the state capital in 
Montgomery, Dr. King’s words—whether from the 1963 “I Have a 
Dream” speech or from other addresses or works by Dr. King—
would be included. No portions of copyrighted works by Dr. King 
were used in Selma, however.122  Several years prior to the making 
of Selma, the King Estate had issued DreamWorks and Warner 
Brothers what apparently was an exclusive movie-rights license re-
garding certain copyrighted works of Dr. King, for possible use in a 
movie that Steven Spielberg would produce. That production has 
not occurred.123 Selma’s producers unsuccessfully sought to ac-
quire the rights from DreamWorks and Warner Brothers and de-
cided not to pursue direct negotiations with the King Estate.  Evi-
dently not willing to employ Dr. King’s actual words and risk legal 
action, the producers opted for dialogue and lines written especial-
ly for their movie.124 
As a result of the tendency to obtain a license or abandon plans 
to make the use, courts have not had occasion to rule on the fair 
use doctrine’s possible application to uses of the “I Have a 
                                                                                                                            
King’s name, image, and intellectual property, certain actions or inactions by Ms. King in 
managing the Center, and Center board member Andrew Young’s supposed commercial 
uses of intellectual property associated with Dr. King. Id. Young, the former Mayor of 
Atlanta and a United Nations ambassador, had been an associate of Dr. King’s during the 
1960s. Id. The parties later settled the case. Beasley, supra note 81. Still pending is a 
lawsuit in which Bernice King, a King Estate board member along with her brothers, 
seeks to stop the sale of Dr. King’s bible and Nobel Prize—a sale her brothers favor. 
Fausset, supra note 94; Martin Luther King, Jr.’s Children Working to Settle Dispute Over 
Bible, Nobel Peace Prize, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 29, 2015), http://www.huffington
post.com/2015/01/29/martin-luther-king-jr-children-legal-dispute_n_65771610.html. 
121 See Volz, supra note 9; Williams, supra note 9; Schiller, supra note 9. 
122 Tim Appelo & Stephen Galloway, Oscars: How “Selma’ Filmmakers Made a Movie 
About MLK Without Using His Words, HOLLYWOOD REPORTER, Dec. 19, 2014, 
http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/news/oscars-how-selma-filmmakers-made-755242. 
123 Id. 
124 Id. 
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Dream” speech or other copyrighted works of Dr. King. This Ar-
ticle’s later proposals will provide guidance to courts in the event 
that a user of the speech spurns obtaining a license and hangs its 
hat on the fair use defense in the infringement case that will almost 
certainly be filed.125 First, however, it is necessary to explain why 
the King Estate’s copyright on the speech is nowhere near expiring 
and will extend for even longer than has commonly been asserted. 
C. Duration of the Copyright on the “I Have a Dream” Speech 
Assuming that the courts in the previously discussed Mister 
Maestro and CBS cases were correct in concluding that the “I Have 
a Dream” speech was validly copyrighted in 1963,126 it becomes 
important to determine how long the copyright will last. As pre-
viously noted, some news articles and short commentaries pub-
lished near the fiftieth anniversary of Dr. King’s delivery of the 
speech stated, as a supposed fact, that the copyright on the speech 
will remain in force through 2038.127 These articles and commenta-
ries made the important point that the copyright on the speech is a 
long way from expiring, but 2038 is not the correct year of expira-
tion. The copyright on the speech will actually last through 2058,128 
as the following overview of copyright duration principles will 
demonstrate. 
The erroneous identification of 2038 as the last year of the cop-
yright’s existence may have stemmed from an assumption that the 
copyright would exist for seventy years beyond Dr. King’s death in 
1968. That assumption is incorrect, even though life-plus-seventy-
years is a basic copyright duration rule that operates today. The 
life-plus-seventy-years rule for copyright duration applies only to 
works created in 1978 or later.129 Because it is a pre-1978 work, the 
duration of the copyright on Dr. King’s speech is measured diffe-
rently.130 The rule governing the duration of copyrights on pre-
1978 works employs a basic-term-plus-renewal-term approach, 
                                                                                                                            
125 See infra Part III. 
126 For discussion of those cases, see supra Part I.A. 
127 See supra note 9. 
128 See 17 U.S.C. § 304 (2012). 
129 Id. § 303. 
130 See id. § 304. 
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with the renewal term having been lengthened and otherwise mod-
ified over the years.131 Therefore, tracing relevant history is neces-
sary to an explanation of how long the copyright on the “I Have a 
Dream” speech will endure. 
When copyright protection came into being on Dr. King’s 
speech in 1963, the then-applicable Copyright Act of 1909 called 
for a maximum copyright duration of fifty-six years. That maxi-
mum duration consisted of a twenty-eight-year basic term plus a 
twenty-eight-year renewal term, if a proper request for a renewal 
term was filed during the last year of the basic term.132 Failure to 
file for renewal meant that the copyright would expire, and the un-
derlying work would enter the public domain, at the end of the 
twenty-eight-year basic term.133 In 1963, therefore, Dr. King could 
have contemplated that if a proper renewal filing occurred near the 
end of the basic term, the copyright on the speech would then run 
through 2019 (a total of fifty-six years). During the early years fol-
lowing Dr. King’s death, his estate would have had the same dura-
tion expectation. The Copyright Act of 1976 changed that expecta-
tion, however, for the King Estate and for other holders of existing 
copyrights. 
The Copyright Act of 1976 broke new ground on the duration 
front and set up 1978 as a critical dividing line. In that enactment, 
Congress established a new duration rule that would apply to copy-
rights on works created in 1978 or later: life of the creator plus fifty 
years.134 As will be seen, a later congressional extension of copy-
right duration substituted seventy years for fifty years in the rule 
just noted.135 The Copyright Act of 1976 also provided that the du-
ration of copyrights on pre-1978 works would still be determined 
according to the basic-term-plus-renewal-term approach.136 How-
ever, Congress tacked on nineteen years to the length of the renew-
                                                                                                                            
131 See id. 
132 Copyright Act of 1901, ch. 320, § 24, 35 Stat. 1075, 1080–81, amended by Copyright 
Act of 1976 (current version at 17 U.S.C. § 304 (2012). 
133 Id. 
134 Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 302, amended by Sonny Bono Copyright Term 
Extension Act of 1998 (current version at 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2012)). 
135 See infra text accompanying notes 139–43. 
136 Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 304, amended by Sonny Bono Copyright Term 
Extension Act of 1998 (current version at 17 U.S.C. § 304 (2012)). 
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al term if the copyright on the relevant pre-1978 work still ex-
isted—either in its basic term or in its renewal term—as of January 
1, 1978.137 What had been a twenty-eight-year renewal term thus 
became a forty-seven-year renewal term instead.138 
Consider, then, the changing duration expectation of the King 
Estate and similarly situated copyright owners as a result of the 
Copyright Act of 1976. With the twenty-eight-year basic term of 
the “I Have a Dream” copyright having commenced in 1963, a 
1991 renewal would trigger a renewal term of not merely twenty-
eight years, but forty-seven years. In 1991, the Estate properly re-
newed the copyright139 and received a renewal term that, as of then, 
would last through 2038. But the duration story does not end there, 
as Congress once again increased copyright duration in the Sonny 
Bono Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998 (“CTEA”).140 
In the CTEA, Congress modified each of the sets of rules iden-
tified above by adding twenty years to the respective durations con-
templated by those rules.141 The duration rule for copyrights on 
works created in 1978 or later thus acquired its current content: life 
of the creator plus seventy years, rather than life plus fifty years.142 
For pre-1978 works still under copyright protection as of 1998—
whether in the basic term or the renewal term—the CTEA gave 
the renewal term that had already been lengthened from twenty-
eight years to forty-seven years a further extension to sixty-seven 
years.143 
Therefore, the duration of a copyright on a pre-1978 work that 
remained under copyright protection as of 1998 is now a total of 
                                                                                                                            
137 Id. 
138 Id. 
139 Estate of Martin Luther King, Jr., Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 194 F.3d 1211, 1214 n.2 (11th Cir. 
1999). 
140 See 17 U.S.C. § 304 (2012). 
141 See id. §§ 302, 304. For more detailed examination of the duration extensions, the 
reasons they were enacted, and the problems resulting from them, see Arlen W. 
Langvardt and Kyle T. Langvardt, Unwise or Unconstitutional?: The Copyright Term 
Extension Act, the Eldred Decision, and the Freezing of the Public Domain for Private Benefit, 
5 MINN. INTELL. PROP. REV. 193, 193–206, 235–92 (2004); see also Khanna, supra note 20, 
at 70–119 (criticizing copyright duration extensions and outlining the cost increases and 
other damaging effects associated with long copyright durations). 
142 17 U.S.C. § 302. 
143 Id. § 304(a)–(b). 
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ninety-five years (the twenty-eight-year basic term plus the sixty-
seven-year renewal term).144 For a pre-1978 work to have been un-
der copyright protection as of 1998, one of two things must have 
happened. One route to still-protected status as of 1998 was the 
copyright owner’s filing of a proper renewal request near the end of 
the twenty-eight-year basic term.145 Alternatively, the copyright 
could have been one that was subject to a 1992 enactment in which 
Congress made renewal automatic (in other words, without an ac-
tual renewal filing) for any copyright as to which a renewal filing 
would otherwise have been necessary in order to maintain copy-
right protection.146 The statute’s effects were to dispense with the 
renewal filing requirement for—and automatically grant a renewal 
term to—all copyrights that came into existence during the years 
1964 through 1977.147 
Because the copyright on the “I Have a Dream” speech com-
menced in 1963, a renewal filing was necessary in 1991 if the copy-
right were to receive the renewal term.148 (The automatic renewal 
statute was not enacted until 1992, so it could not have applied to 
the copyright on the speech.) When the King Estate took the ne-
cessary renewal action in 1991, it acquired a renewal term of forty-
seven years.149 This meant, of course, that the copyright was still in 
existence when 1998 arrived—a fact that then triggered an entitle-
ment to the CTEA’s duration extension. The renewal term that 
would have been forty-seven years under the law in effect at the 
time of the copyright renewal thus ripened into a sixty-seven-year 
                                                                                                                            
144 Id. 
145 See id. § 304(a). 
146 Id. 
147 See id. Copyrights that came into being prior to 1964 did not benefit from the 
automatic renewal measure because their twenty-eight-year basic term would have 
ended—and the necessary time for a renewal filing would have arrived—before the 1992 
enactment of the measure.  See id. Works whose copyrights arose in 1978 or later were not 
affected by the automatic renewal provision because the duration of those copyrights is 
determined under rules that do not use the basic-term-plus-renewal approach. See id. 
§ 302(a). 
148 See supra text accompanying notes 132–33. 
149 See id. 
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renewal term.150 Accordingly, the King Estate’s copyright on the 
“I Have a Dream” speech will run through 2058.151 
II. THE FAIR USE DOCTRINE: THE RELEVANT FACTORS 
AND LEADING CASES 
Unlicensed use of part or all of a copyrighted work’s expres-
sion, as opposed to use of general ideas or facts set forth in the 
work,152 may constitute infringement because one or more of the 
copyright owner’s rights could be implicated.153 Not all such uses 
give rise to infringement liability, however. If the fair use doctrine 
applies, the user is not liable for infringement despite having bor-
rowed the work’s expression without the copyright owner’s per-
mission.154 Reliance on the fair use doctrine entails risk, however, 
because the copyright owner probably will not agree with the user’s 
position that fair use protection should apply. Infringement litiga-
tion then may be likely to result, with the court having to decide 
whether fair use principles should protect the defendant against 
liability. 
This Part of the Article provides an overview of the fair use 
doctrine and the factor-based analysis in which courts must engage 
when they rule on fair use arguments. It also considers leading Su-
preme Court decisions that have provided guidance for application 
of the fair use factors. This discussion will help to support Part 
IV’s proposed fair use analysis for cases involving unlicensed uses 
of the “I Have a Dream” speech and other historic copyrighted 
works. 
                                                                                                                            
150 See supra text accompanying notes 137–38. 
151 Copyrights run through the end of the relevant calendar year. 17 U.S.C. § 305 
(2012). The conclusion that the “I Have a Dream” copyright will run through 2058 
assumes, of course, that Congress does not enact another duration extension. For an 
objection to calls raised in recent years for yet another duration extension, see Arlen W. 
Langvardt, The Beat Should Not Go On: Resisting Early Calls for Further Extensions of 
Copyright Duration, 112 PENN. ST. L.J. 783 (2008). 
152 See 17 U.S.C. § 102. 
153 Id. §§ 106, 501. In general, copyright owners have the exclusive rights to reproduce 
their work, prepare derivative works based on it, distribute copies of it, display it, and 
publicly perform it. Id. § 106. The display and performance rights apply only as to certain 
copyrighted works. See id. 
154 Id. § 107. 
968 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.[Vol. XXV:939 
 
A. Fair Use Purposes, Candidates, and Factors 
The fair use doctrine limits the copyright owner’s rights by 
serving as a defense to an infringement claim155 in order to “per-
mit[] courts to avoid rigid application of the copyright statute 
when, on occasion, it would stifle the very creativity which that law 
is designed to foster.”156 Fair use was originally a judicial creation 
but is now recognized by statute.157 In 17 U.S.C. § 107, Congress 
indicated that good candidates for fair use protection include uses 
that reflect “purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, 
[and] teaching . . . scholarship, or research.”158 
There is no guarantee, however, that the fair use defense will 
apply in a given case even if the use reflects a purpose of the sort 
singled out in § 107. The statute lists four factors that courts must 
consider when deciding whether a particular use merits fair use 
protection. 
Application of the factors, to be identified and discussed short-
ly, may result in a conclusion that the use was indeed fair use but 
may lead to the opposite conclusion.159 Importantly, the factors 
enumerated in § 107 do not compose an exclusive set.160 Courts 
may supplement the listed factors with other relevant considera-
tions.161 
                                                                                                                            
155 Id. For a listing of the copyright owner’s exclusive rights, see 17 U.S.C. § 106. 
156 Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 236 (1990) (internal quotation marks and citation 
omitted). When the fair use defense is invoked, the key question is “whether the 
copyright law’s goal of promoting the ‘Progress of Science and useful Arts’ would be 
better served by allowing the use than by preventing it.” Castle Rock Entm’t, Inc. v. 
Carol Publ’g Grp., 150 F.3d 132 (2d Cir. 1998) (internal quotation marks and citation 
omitted). See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (granting power to Congress to enact copyright 
and patent laws in order to “promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts”). 
157 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012). See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. 510 U.S. 569, 576–
77 (1994) (noting the fair use defense’s history). 
158 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012). 
159 See id.; Campbell, 510 U.S. at 577. 
160 Section 107 states that when a court is deciding whether fair use protection applies, 
the factors courts are to consider “shall include” the ones listed in the statute. 17 U.S.C. 
§ 107. This language indicates that the statute’s list of factors is not all-inclusive. See id. 
161 See HOWARD B. ABRAMS, 2 THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT § 15:32 (2013). For instance, 
the public interest may sometimes be a relevant additional consideration. See, e.g., Perfect 
10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1168 (9th Cir. 2006). As will be seen, 
consideration of the public interest will play a role in this Article’s later proposal of a fair 
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The fair use doctrine contemplates a case-by-case analysis that 
is, therefore, highly fact-specific.162 In applying the fair use factors 
and perhaps other relevant considerations, courts engage in a 
weighing-and-balancing approach in which no one factor is solely 
determinative.163 As the following discussion will reveal, each § 107 
factor adds a different point of emphasis to the fair use analysis. 
The first factor listed in § 107 is “the purpose and character of 
the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is 
for nonprofit educational purposes.”164 This statutory language 
obviously calls for distinctions to be drawn between commercial 
and noncommercial uses, but those distinctions are only part of the 
inquiry. Factor number one also takes into account other consider-
ations such as whether the use is transformative in nature165 and 
whether the use reflects a generally favored purpose such as criti-
cism or commentary, news reporting, or educational use.166 A 
heavy commercial motivation may cut against fair use, especially if 
that motivation is not offset by some countervailing considera-
tion.167 Conversely, a lack of a profit motive may point toward fair 
use.168 Because no single factor is solely determinative, however, it 
is possible that even a use with a significant commercial motivation 
could be classified as fair use once all of the statutory factors and 
other relevant considerations are taken into account.169 
                                                                                                                            
use analysis for cases dealing with uses of historic works such as the “I Have a Dream” 
speech. See infra Part III. 
162 See e.g., Campbell, 510 U.S. at 577. As a result, it can be difficult to predict the 
outcome of a particular case; see also Pamela Samuelson, Unbundling Fair Uses, 77 
FORDHAM L. REV. 2537, 2540 (2009). 
163 E.g., Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley, Ltd., 448 F.3d 605, 608 (2d Cir. 
2006). 
164 17 U.S.C. § 107. 
165 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579. 
166 Such purposes are the ones singled out in the fair use section of the Copyright Act. 
See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012). 
167 See id.; Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 562 
(1985). 
168 See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012). 
169 See id.; Campbell, 510 U.S. at 584–85. It is also possible that even a nonprofit use may 
be held not to be fair use once the fair use factors are applied. Id. at 584. Although the first 
factor is not solely determinative of whether a given use constituted fair use, courts 
frequently place significant emphasis on that factor. Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of 
U.S. Copyright Fair Use Decisions, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 549, 555, 571–72, 583, 587, 597. 
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Section 107 lists “the nature of the copyrighted work” as the 
second fair use factor.170 Courts have frequently noted that this fac-
tor contemplates distinguishing between highly creative works and 
largely factual works designed for public consumption, with bor-
rowings of expression from the former potentially being less likely 
to constitute fair use than borrowings of expression from the lat-
ter.171 As the Supreme Court has observed, however, drawing such 
a distinction sometimes tends not to be especially helpful in “sepa-
rating the fair use sheep from the infringing goats . . . .”172 Accor-
dingly, the distinction may carry less weight in the fair use analysis 
than courts’ recitation of it would seem to suggest.173 
The Supreme Court has identified another relevant question 
contemplated by the second fair use factor: whether the borrowed-
from work was published or, instead, unpublished.174 A defendant 
who borrows from an unpublished work usurps the copyright own-
er’s important right of first publication.175 Such a borrowing tends 
to cut against fair use,176 though § 107 provides a reminder that a 
borrowing from an unpublished work may still qualify for fair use 
protection if full consideration of the fair use factors so indicates.177 
A borrowing from a published work does not undermine the copy-
right owner’s right of first publication but does not entitle the bor-
rower to any special credit in the fair use analysis. In the borrow-
ing-from-published-work situation, the second fair use factor ends 
up having little significance.178 
Section 107 lists, as the third fair use factor, “the amount and 
substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted 
                                                                                                                            
Within the first factor, courts often inquire into whether the use was transformative. Id. at 
583 587–88, 603–06. For further discussion of transformative uses, see infra Part III.A. 
170 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012). 
171 E.g., Campbell, 510 U.S. at 586; Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley, Ltd., 
448 F.3d 605, 612 (2d Cir. 2006). 
172 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 586. 
173 See id.; Bill Graham Archives, 448 F.3d at 612. 
174 Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 563–64 (1985); 
see id. at 552–53. 
175 Id. at 550–53, 563–64. 
176 Id. 
177 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012). 
178 See, e.g., Bill Graham Archives, 448 F.3d at 612. 
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work as a whole.”179 Borrowing material that is quite substantial 
either quantitatively or qualitatively may often cut against fair 
use.180 However, the extent of the defendant’s borrowing must be 
considered in light of the purposes underlying the defendant’s use 
of the copyrighted work.181 If the defendant used what was reason-
ably necessary to advance purposes that the fair use doctrine might 
favor, even substantial borrowing could still be fair use upon con-
sideration of all of the factors.182 Conversely, borrowing to an ex-
tent clearly exceeding what was reasonably necessary may cause 
the third factor to cut against fair use, despite the existence of an 
otherwise favored purpose.183 
The fourth fair use factor identified in § 107 is “the effect of 
the use on the potential market for or value of the copyrighted 
work.”184 If the defendant’s use adversely affects the copyright 
owner’s ability to exploit the work financially, this factor tends to 
cut against—sometimes strongly against—fair use.185 In deciding 
whether such adverse effect is present, courts consider not only 
primary markets for the work itself but also reasonable markets for 
derivative uses of the work.186 
Two Supreme Court decisions merit special attention because 
they have played leading roles in shaping the fair use analysis and 
because they relate in different ways to this Article’s later proposal 
of a fair use analysis for cases involving uses of historic works such 
as the “I Have a Dream” speech. The following subsection dis-
cusses Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises,187 which 
                                                                                                                            
179 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012). 
180 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 586; Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 564–66; Bill Graham Archives, 
448 F.3d at 613. 
181 See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 586. 
182 See id. at 586; Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1167 (9th Cir. 
2006). 
183 See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 564–66. 
184 17 U.S.C. § 107. 
185 Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 566–68. 
186 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 592–94. To be considered here, the market must be a 
reasonable, logical market of sort that the copyright owner would be inclined to pursue. 
For instance, if the defendant’s use was highly transformative, there probably was no 
impairment of a market the copyright owner would logically pursue. See id. at 591–92; Bill 
Graham Archives, 448 F.3d at 613–15. 
187 471 U.S. 539 (1985). 
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might seem at first glance to run contrary to the Article’s proposal 
but which, if properly understood and read in context, does not 
amount to a significant obstacle.188 A later subsection will examine 
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.,189 which offers insights relevant 
to the Article’s proposal even though the nature of the copyrighted 
work and the defendants’ use in Campbell differed from the nature 
of the copyrighted works and types of uses with which this Article 
is concerned.190 
B. The Harper & Row Decision 
In 1977, an editor at the political magazine The Nation, came in-
to possession of a copy of the then-unpublished manuscript of for-
mer President Ford’s memoirs.191 The editor then wrote an article 
that used quotations and paraphrased language from the manu-
script.192 This occurred without permission from the Harper & 
Row publishing company, owner of the copyright on the manu-
script.193 The quotations borrowed from the copyrighted work con-
stituted thirteen percent of the editor’s article, totaled approx-
imately 300 words, and pertained for the most part to President 
Ford’s decision to pardon former President Nixon.194 
The publication of the article in The Nation compromised Har-
per & Row’s publication plans, which had called for excerpts from 
the memoirs to appear in Time magazine under an existing licens-
ing agreement.195 The full memoirs would then appear in book form 
shortly thereafter. Before the excerpts could appear in Time, how-
ever, the article in The Nation was published. Having been 
scooped, Time exercised a contractual right to be released from the 
excerpts deal—meaning that Harper & Row lost the licensing op-
                                                                                                                            
188 See infra Part III.C. 
189 510 U.S. 569 (1994). 
190 See infra Part II.C. 
191 Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 542 (1985). 
192 Id. 
193 Id. at 542–43. The article also used facts from the Ford memoirs. Id. at 543, 
However, facts, unlike expression, may be freely borrowed from copyrighted works. See 
id. at 547, 548–49; 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2012). 
194 Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 542–43, 548, 565. 
195 Id. at 542–43. 
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portunity and the payment called for the agreement.196 Harper & 
Row then sued The Nation’s publisher and affiliated defendants for 
copyright infringement, and won in federal district court.197 After 
the US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed on fair 
use grounds, the Supreme Court granted certiorari.198 
The Supreme Court made clear in Harper & Row that the de-
fendants’ admitted use of quotations and closely paraphrased lan-
guage from the copyrighted manuscript was a taking of protected 
expression that would subject the defendants to infringement liabil-
ity unless the fair use defense came to their rescue.199 Before engag-
ing in detailed application of the fair use factors set forth in the 
Copyright Act, the Court commented unfavorably on the defen-
dants’ advocacy of an expansive version of the fair use doctrine and 
on their argument that the First Amendment should insulate them 
from liability.200 In the Court’s view, it was unnecessary to consid-
er free speech interests to any greater extent than customary fair 
use principles would, despite the identity of the copyrighted work’s 
author (a former President) and the high level of public interest in 
the subject matter of the borrowed words (the pardoning of an ex-
President).201 A public figure exception to a copyright owner’s 
rights would be unwarranted, the Court reasoned.202 Adhering to 
the conventional view that the fair use doctrine operates as a built-
                                                                                                                            
196 Id. 
197 Id. at 543. 
198 Id. at 542. 
199 Id. at 541–42, 547, 548–49. 
200 See id. at 555–56. 
201 See id. 
202 Id. at 557, 559–60, 569. Writing for the majority, Justice O’Connor stated that the 
defendants’ arguments “would expand fair use to effectively destroy any expectation of 
copyright protection in the work of a public figure.” Id. at 557. Under the circumstances 
present in the case, the Court saw “no warrant for expanding the doctrine of fair use to 
create what amounts to a public figure exception to copyright.” Id. at 560. These 
statements by the Court may seem to run contrary to the fair use proposal advanced later 
in this Article. However, as will be seen, the statements must be evaluated within the 
context of Harper & Row—a context quite different from that of cases involving uses of 
historic works such as the “I Have a Dream” speech. If properly evaluated and 
interpreted, the Harper & Row statements do not block the Article’s proposal. See infra 
Part III.B. 
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in safeguard of First Amendment interests,203 the Court indicated 
that standard fair use analysis would be used to determine whether 
the defendants were liable.204 
Seeming to suggest that the statute’s mention of “commer-
cial” in the first fair use factor205 called for consideration of wheth-
er any meaningful commercial motivation was present (as opposed 
to whether such a motivation predominated), the Court deter-
mined that The Nation’s for-profit character significantly dimi-
nished the defendants’ fair use chances.206 Justice O’Connor’s ma-
jority opinion ascribed little significance to the defendants’ argu-
ment that the article in The Nation involved news reporting or a 
similar effort to inform readers about matters of great public inter-
est.207 Although Congress has identified such purposes as good 
candidates for fair use treatment,208 the Court’s resolution of the 
first fair use factor against the defendants focused mainly on the 
profit motive underlying the defendants’ magazine.209 The Court 
                                                                                                                            
203 See, e.g., Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 218–21 (2003); see also SunTrust Bank v. 
Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1264–65 (11th Cir. 2001) (recognizing this 
conventional view but noting that fair use analysis must be conducted with clear 
awareness of First Amendment interests). For analysis of the conventional view and its 
potential shortcomings, as well as proposals for making the fair use doctrine more 
sensitive to First Amendment interests, see Arlen W. Langvardt and Tara E. Langvardt, 
Caught in the Copyright Rye: Freeing First Amendment Interests from the Constraints of the 
Traditional View, 2 HARV. J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 99, 118–55 (2011). 
204 Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 556–60. 
205 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012). 
206 See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 562–63. 
207 See id. at 542–43, 558, 561. The Court appeared not to recognize that the public 
interest may play a significant role in the fair use analysis and may call for a First 
Amendment-based privilege in certain copyright infringement cases. See Robert C. 
Denicola, Copyright and Free Speech: Constitutional Limitations on the Protection of 
Expression, 67 CALIF. L. REV. 283, 297 (1979). 
208 See 17 U.S.C. § 107. 
209 See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 561–63. Nearly all magazines and similar publications 
are for-profit in nature, however. Castle Rock Entm’t, Inc. v. Carol Publ’g Group, 150 
F.3d 132, 141 (2d Cir. 1998). The Court’s analysis in Harper & Row differed sharply from 
what general First Amendment principles would have dictated if those principles had 
been applied. The article in The Nation constituted political speech, which receives full 
First Amendment protection. See e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 329, 340 
(2010); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 406, 412 (1989). General First Amendment 
principles also indicate that the magazine would have been classified as noncommercial 
speech, notwithstanding the profit motive. See, e.g., Harte-Hanks Commc’ns, Inc. v. 
Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 667 (1989). The magazine would not have been treated as 
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thus placed almost no weight on purposes and considerations that 
might have been regarded as offsetting the commercial motiva-
tion.210 As will be seen, however, a later decision of the Court 
would adopt a far more measured approach to consideration of 
commercial motivation.211 
Turning to the second fair use factor,212 the Harper & Row 
Court emphasized the unpublished nature of the copyrighted work 
and the fact that the defendants had deprived the copyright owner 
of the important right of first publication.213 Therefore, the Court 
concluded, the second factor cut strongly against fair use.214 In so 
ruling, the Court made the unpublished-versus-published issue a 
key component of the factor-two analysis and indicated that a de-
                                                                                                                            
less-protected commercial speech, because the Supreme Court’s commercial speech 
definition applies to advertising and little, if anything, more. See Virginia State Bd. of 
Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 762, 770–72 (1976). 
The greater protection for speech contemplated by general First Amendment principles 
suggests flaws in the courts’ conventional view—see supra text accompanying note 203—
that the fair use doctrine sufficiently safeguards free speech interests and eliminates the 
need for a separate First Amendment defense in copyright infringement cases. See 
Langvardt & Langvardt, supra note 203, at 118–55; see also Neil Weinstock Netanel, First 
Amendment Constraints on Copyright After Golan v. Holder, 60 UCLA L. REV. 1082, 1110 
(2013) [hereinafter Netanel, First Amendment Constraints] (noting that fair use doctrine 
sometimes “falls glaringly short” in the First Amendment sense); Ned Snow, The 
Forgotten Right of Fair Use, 62 CASE WES. L. REV. 135, 138 (2011) (characterizing free 
speech and copyright as being “[a]t war,” despite existence of fair use doctrine). 
210 See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 558–61. Harper & Row’s seemingly hardline 
application of the first fair use factor appears to have been influenced by a concern that 
pertained mainly to the second factor but permeated the Court’s opinion: the defendants’ 
undermining of the important right of first publication that Harper & Row held with 
regard to the previously unpublished manuscript. See id. at 551–55, 562–64, 569. In 
addition, the Court’s factor-one approach may have been influenced by concern about the 
mysterious circumstances under which the defendants acquired a copy of the unpublished 
Ford manuscript and about the magazine editor’s apparent desire to “scoop” other 
publications. Justice O’Connor’s majority opinion suggests that the Court may have 
regarded the defendants as having a special profit motive that exceeded the usual profit 
motive for issues of the magazine. See id. at 562–63. It does not appear, however, that the 
defendants acted unlawfully in obtaining access to a copy of the manuscript from an 
“undisclosed source.” Id. at 542; see also id. at 562–63. Moreover, use of undisclosed 
sources and wanting to scoop other publications seem to be common media practices. 
211 See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 571, 579–80, 584–85 (1994). 
For discussion of Campbell, see infra Part II.C. 
212 That factor is the nature of the copyrighted work. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012). 
213 Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 551–53. 
214 Id. at 551–55, 563–64, 569. 
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fendant’s having borrowed from an unpublished work would likely 
make succeeding with the fair use defense an uphill battle.215 
The defendants also fared poorly on the third factor,216 with the 
Court concluding that the expression borrowed from the copy-
righted manuscript was qualitatively substantial even if not quanti-
tatively so.217 The Court emphasized “the expressive value of the 
[borrowed] excerpts and their key role in the infringing work,”218 
and observed that the defendants used some of the “most powerful 
passages” in the Ford manuscript.219 In the Court’s view, the de-
fendants had taken the “‘heart’” of the copyrighted work.220 The 
Court concluded, therefore, that the third factor also cut against 
fair use.221 
The fourth fair use factor222 likewise proved to be a major prob-
lem for the defendants, as the Court identified what it saw as a 
clear adverse effect on Harper & Row’s ability to reap financial ad-
vantage in the marketplace.223 Noting that the fourth factor con-
templates the harm to actual or potential markets for the original 
                                                                                                                            
215 See id. at 550–51, 552–55, 563–64. Justice O’Connor’s majority opinion repeatedly 
expressed disapproval of users’ actions that compromise a copyright owner’s right of first 
publication. See id. The Court’s concerns along those lines not only shaped the factor-two 
analysis but may also have influenced the Court to take the previously noted hardline 
approach to the application of the first fair use factor. Harper & Row reflects little 
inclination on the part of the majority to weigh the defendants’ factor-one purpose of 
informing the public about a political and historical matter of great importance against the 
factor-two consideration that the Ford memoirs constituted an unpublished work. See id., 
at 561–63. 
216 17 U.S.C. § 107. 
217 Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 564–65. 
218 Id. at 566. 
219 Id. at 565. 
220 Id. (quoting district court’s opinion). 
221 Id. at 564–66, 569. 
222 17 U.S.C. § 107. 
223 471 U.S. at 566–69. Justice O’Connor’s majority opinion labeled the fourth factor as 
“the single most important” of the factors, presumably in a relative sense. See id. at 566–
68. In a later decision, the Court backed away somewhat from that characterization of the 
fourth factor’s importance by noting that “[m]arket harm is a matter of degree, and 
importance of this factor will vary, not only with the amount of harm, but also with the 
relative strength of the showing on the other factors.” Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 
Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 591 n.21; see also Netanel, First Amendment Constraints, supra note 209, 
at 1111 (noting Campbell’s movement away from Harper & Row in regard to factor number 
four). 
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work and derivative works based upon it,224 the Court identified 
clear actual harm in the collapse of Harper & Row’s licensing deal 
with Time and the loss of the payment the publishing company was 
to receive.225 
Harper & Row’s analysis reflected a less-than-expansive ap-
proach to the fair use doctrine and a possible weakening of the doc-
trine’s effectiveness in protecting those who borrow from copy-
righted works for public interest-related purposes.226 The major 
decision to be discussed in the following subsection, however, sug-
gested a potentially broader scope for the fair use defense. 
C. The Campbell Decision 
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.227 arose after Luther Camp-
bell and fellow members of the musical group 2 Live Crew wrote 
and recorded a parody version of “Oh, Pretty Woman,” a song co-
written by Roy Orbison and William Dees and recorded by Orbison 
in hit-making fashion during the mid-1960s.228 Acuff-Rose Music, 
Inc., which owned the “Oh, Pretty Woman” copyright, had denied 
2 Live Crew’s request for permission to include the parody version 
on an album the group planned to release in 1989.229 2 Live Crew 
proceeded with its plan anyway and sold approximately 250,000 
copies of the album during the first year after its release.230 Acuff-
Rose then sued the group members and their record label for copy-
right infringement.231 A federal district court granted summary 
judgment for the defendants on fair use grounds, but the U.S. 
                                                                                                                            
224 Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 566–68. 
225 Id. at 567; see id. at 542–43. “Rarely will a case of copyright infringement present 
such clear-cut evidence of actual damage,” Justice O’Connor observed. Id. at 567. The 
Court also suggested that the publication of the article in The Nation could adversely 
affect sales of the Ford memoirs, because readers of the article would already have been 
exposed to the supposed heart of the book. See id. at 564–66, 568–69. 
226 See Neil Weinstock Netanel, Locating Copyright Within the First Amendment Skein, 54 
STAN. L. REV. 1, 21–23 (2001). 
227 510 U.S. 569 (1994). 
228 Id. at 572–73. 
229 Id. 
230 Id. 
231 Id. Although the defendants’ decision to proceed after being denied permission may 
have made Acuff-Rose particularly inclined to sue them, it did not deprive them of the 
ability to invoke the fair use defense. Id. at 585 n.18. 
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Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded be-
cause, in its view, the commercial nature of the defendants’ parody 
barred it from fair use protection.232 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Campbell “to deter-
mine whether 2 Live Crew’s commercial parody could be a fair 
use.”233 Of course, the Court’s answer to that question has shaped 
the analysis of fair use issues in cases involving parodies, but 
Campbell’s significance is not restricted to the parody setting. Prin-
ciples and considerations articulated in Campbell have assumed 
great importance in the fair use analysis regardless of whether the 
use at issue was a parody.234 
In Campbell, the Court quickly concluded that parody may 
qualify for fair use protection.235 Writing for a unanimous Court, 
Justice Souter noted that through the use of humor, the parodist 
“can provide social benefit, by shedding light on an earlier work, 
and, in the process, creating a new one.”236 As a form of criticism 
or commentary, parody was among the types of uses singled out by 
Congress as a candidate for fair use protection.237 The Court em-
phasized, however, that it was not creating any presumption that 
parody is fair use, because “parody, like any other use, has to work 
its way through the [four fair use] factors, and be judged case by 
case, in light of the ends of the copyright law.”238 
As part of its application of the first fair use factor, the Court 
stated that this factor’s focus on the purpose and character of the 
                                                                                                                            
232 Id. at 573–74. 
233 Id. at 574. 
234 Campbell has had an “immense” impact on fair use analysis. See ABRAMS, supra note 
161, § 15:26. The decision constituted a “significant watershed” in that regard. Id. 
235 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579–80. 
236 Id. at 579. 
237 Id. at 578–79. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012). 
238 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 581. In addition, Justice Souter explained, a parody would be a 
plausible candidate for fair use treatment only if it reflected, to a meaningful extent, 
commentary on the copyrighted work being parodied, as opposed to merely using the 
work as a vehicle for commentary on other subjects. Id. at 580. The parody at issue in 
Campbell met that threshold requirement, the Court observed. Id. at 582–83. Justice 
Souter suggested that if the parody included commentary on other matters such as social 
issues, it could still be a candidate for fair use protection as long as it included 
commentary on the work from which the parody borrowed. See id. at 579–80, 581–82, 
582–83. 
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defendant’s use involves determining “whether the new work 
merely supersede[s] the objects of the original creation … or in-
stead adds something new, with a further purpose or different cha-
racter, altering the first with new expression, meaning, or message; 
it asks, in other words, whether and to what extent the new work is 
‘transformative.’”239 Although the Court went on to note that a 
transformative character was “not absolutely necessary for a find-
ing of fair use,” it stated that transformative uses “lie at the heart 
of the fair use doctrine’s breathing space within the confines of 
copyright.”240 Campbell’s emphasis on transformative uses has had 
a profound effect on fair use analysis, as courts ever since have paid 
considerable attention to whether defendants seeking fair use pro-
tection can credibly claim that their borrowing from the copy-
righted work featured a transformative character.241 
The Court also observed in Campbell that the more transforma-
tive the use, the less important will be other considerations, such as 
commercialism, that might otherwise cut against fair use.242 This 
statement related directly to another key aspect of the Court’s ap-
plication of the first fair use factor: the role a defendant’s profit 
motive should play in the fair use analysis. The Sixth Circuit had 
held in Campbell that the “‘blatantly commercial purpose [of 2 
Live Crew’s parody] prevents [it] from being a fair use.’”243 In 
doing so, the Sixth Circuit had interpreted Sony Corp. of America v. 
Universal City Studios, Inc.,244 as setting up an essentially unassail-
able presumption against fair use for any use reflecting a meaning-
ful commercial purpose.245 The Supreme Court, however, empha-
sized that the Sixth Circuit had erred in so interpreting Sony and in 
giving essentially conclusive effect to the fact that the defendants 
had profited financially.246 
                                                                                                                            
239 Id. at 579. In using the term “transformative,” the Court was quoting Judge Leval’s 
influential article. Leval, supra note 15, at 1111. The Court noted that parody will often 
have a strong claim to being transformative. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579. 
240 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579. 
241 ABRAMS, supra note 161, § 15:42.30; see Samuelson, supra note 162, at 2549–55. 
242 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579. 
243 Id. at 575 (quoting Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. v. Campbell, 972 F.2d 1429, 1439 (6th Cir. 
1992)). 
244 464 U.S. 417 (1984). 
245 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 583–84. 
246 Id. at 584–85. 
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Instead, Justice Souter stressed, the question of whether a use 
was commercial is only a part of the inquiry under the first fair use 
factor, which, in any event, contemplates that the significance of a 
defendant’s profit-making motivation would vary with the context 
of the case.247 The Court referred to Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. 
v. Nation Enterprises248 as having established that the commercial 
character of a use is merely a consideration that could weigh 
against fair use, not something that makes the use presumptively 
unfair.249 If uses with any meaningful commercial character were 
presumed not to be fair use, Justice Souter continued, “the pre-
sumption would swallow nearly all of the illustrative uses listed in 
[the fair use section of the Copyright Act], including news report-
ing, comment, criticism, teaching, scholarship, and research, since 
these activities ‘are generally conducted for profit in this coun-
try.’”250 In the case at hand, then, the profit-making nature of 2 
Live Crew’s use of the copyrighted work did not render the fair use 
defense off-limits to the defendants.251 
Although Justice Souter cited Harper & Row as being consistent 
with the notion that the first fair use factor involves considering 
more than just whether the use had a commercial character,252 
Campbell’s treatment of the first factor differed significantly from 
Harper & Row’s application of it. Harper & Row emphasized the 
defendants’ profit motive and devoted minimal attention to poten-
tially offsetting considerations such as informing the public about 
important historical matters.253 In Campbell, however, the emphasis 
was reversed. There, the Court stressed the role of offsetting con-
                                                                                                                            
247 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 584–85. To underscore this point, the Court stated that “the 
mere fact that a use is educational and not for profit does not insulate it from a finding of 
infringement, any more than the commercial nature of a use bars a finding of fairness.” Id. 
at 584. As an example of how the significance of a profit motive will vary with the context, 
the Court noted that the use of a copyrighted work “to advertise a product, even in a 
parody, will be entitled to less indulgence under the first factor of the fair use enquiry than 
the sale of a parody for its own sake ….” Id. at 585. 
248 471 U.S. 539 (1985). 
249 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 584–85. 
250 Id. at 584 (quoting Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 592 (Brennan, J., dissenting)); see also 
17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012). 
251 See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 583–85. 
252 See id. at 583–84. 
253 See supra text accompanying notes 205–11. 
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siderations such as transformative character and other favored 
types of purposes in reducing the attention a reviewing court 
should pay to a defendant’s profit motive.254 Campbell thus con-
templated a factor-one analysis that is potentially more favorable to 
defendants making fair use arguments than was the analysis in 
Harper & Row.255 
After noting the second fair use factor256 but concluding that it 
would carry little weight in the case before the Court,257 Justice 
Souter turned to the third factor, the amount and substantiality of 
the portion borrowed by the defendant from the copyrighted 
work.258 The Court observed that this factor calls for consideration 
not only of the quantity of the portion used but also of the qualita-
tive importance of what was borrowed.259 Citing the interplay be-
tween the third and fourth fair use factors,260 the Court stated that 
“a work composed primarily of an original, particularly its heart, 
with little added or changed, is more likely to be a merely supersed-
ing use, fulfilling demand for the original.”261 
The Court nevertheless observed that the extent of the defen-
dant’s borrowing must be evaluated in light of the defendant’s 
                                                                                                                            
254 See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 578–85. See also 17 U.S.C. § 107 (setting forth types of 
purposes that may be good candidates for fair use treatment). 
255 See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 578–85. In citing Justice Brennan’s dissent in Harper & 
Row, Justice Souter may have been implying in Campbell that the Harper & Row Court had 
paid too little attention to the defendants’ news reporting purpose. See Campbell, 510 U.S. 
at 584; see also Samuelson, supra note 162, at 2565 (characterizing Harper & Row as an 
overreaction to the facts before the Court and Campbell as having a moderating effect on 
the Harper & Row analysis). 
256 That factor is the nature of the copyrighted work. 17 U.S.C. § 107. 
257 The Court noted the conventional view that borrowings from highly creative works 
may not seem to be as strong a candidate for fair use treatment as borrowings from largely 
factual works, but then proceeded to note that the conventional view in the end may not 
offer much useful insight. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 586. Justice Souter observed that the 
highly creative nature of copyrighted fictional works “is not much help in this case, or 
ever likely to help much in separating the fair use sheep from the infringing goats in a 
parody case, since parodies almost invariably copy publicly known, expressive works.” Id. 
The Court’s treatment of factor number two consisted of one paragraph. Id. 
258 17 U.S.C. § 107. 
259 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 587. 
260 See 17 U.S.C § 107. For discussion of Campbell’s application of the fourth factor, see 
infra text accompanying notes 269–76. 
261 Id. at 587–88. 
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purposes.262 For instance, parodists who borrow from copyrighted 
works must have sufficient latitude to to “conjure up” the original 
work in the mind of the audience and thereby cause the audience to 
recognize the parody’s target. Otherwise, the humor and commen-
tary in the parody will not be effective.263 In a given parody case, 
therefore, even the borrowing of the work’s recognizable or me-
morable “heart” may not cause the third factor to cut against fair 
use, if such borrowing was reasonably necessary to furtherance of 
the parodic purpose. Significantly greater borrowing than what was 
reasonably necessary, however, could cause the third factor—and 
perhaps the fourth as well—to work against the defendant’s fair 
use argument.264 
Applying these principles to the parody before it in Campbell, 
the Court stated that in “cop[ying] the characteristic opening bass 
riff (or musical phrase) of the original,” as well as some of its lyrics, 
the defendants borrowed what “may be [characterized as] the 
‘heart’ of the original.”265 Justice Souter observed, however, that 
“the heart is also what most readily conjures up the [copyrighted 
work] for parody, and it is the heart at which parody takes aim.”266 
He added: “Copying does not become excessive in relation to pa-
rodic purpose merely because the portion taken was the original’s 
heart. If 2 Live Crew had copied a significantly less memorable part 
of the original, it is difficult to see how its parodic character would 
have come through.”267 
                                                                                                                            
262 See id. at 586–87. 
263 Id. at 588. 
264 See id. at 588–89. Only on a case-by-case basis can it be determined whether the 
extent of the defendant’s borrowing fit generally within or, or significantly exceeded, 
what was reasonably necessary in light of the defendant’s purpose. See id. at 586–89. 
265 Id. at 588. 
266 Id. The Court also stressed that the defendants had not simply engaged in copying 
from “Oh, Pretty Woman.” They also added new considerable musical and lyrical 
expression. Id. at 589. 
267 Id. at 588–89. The Court concluded that the borrowing of lyrics from the 
copyrighted song was not excessive under the circumstances. It expressed no view on 
whether the defendants’ repetitions of the song’s distinctive bass riff went too far, leaving 
that issue for consideration on remand in light of the principles articulated in Campbell. Id. 
at 589. The Court’s repeated references to the “heart” of a work seemed designed to 
distinguish the parody setting of Campbell from the non-parody context of Harper & Row. 
See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 587–89. In Harper & Row, the defendant’s borrowing of the 
supposed heart of President Ford’s unpublished memoirs was among the reasons why the 
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Much of Campbell’s discussion of the third fair use factor was 
tailored to parodies because the case involved a parody. But early in 
its third-factor discussion—before it began exploring specific paro-
dy-related issues—the Court plainly stated that the extent of the 
defendant’s borrowing must be evaluated in light of the defen-
dant’s purpose.268 Because this general statement was not by its 
terms restricted to the parody setting, it should play an important 
role in the factor-three analysis even when the defendant seeks fair 
use protection for a use meant to further purposes other than paro-
dy. 
The Campbell Court then turned to the fourth fair use factor, 
which calls for consideration of whether defendant’s use had an 
actual or likely adverse effect on markets for the copyrighted 
work.269 The Court noted that the Sixth Circuit, which had erred in 
ruling that a use with a meaningful commercial character could not 
be fair use, committed a similar error in regard to factor number 
four by presuming market harm because of the commercial nature 
of the defendants’ use of the copyrighted work.270 The Court con-
cluded, instead, that when the defendant’s use is transformative, 
market substitution by consumers is less likely and therefore can-
not be presumed to have occurred.271 
In addition, the fourth factor requires consideration of whether 
the defendant’s actions would be likely to harm logical markets for 
derivative works based on the copyrighted work.272 The relevant 
derivative markets to be considered here include “only those [uses] 
that creators of original works would in general develop or license 
                                                                                                                            
Court denied fair use protection to the defendant. See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 564–66. 
For discussion of Harper & Row, see supra Part II.B. 
268 See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 586–87. 
269 See 17 U.S.C. § 107. 
270 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 591; see also id. at 583–84. 
271 Id. at 591. The Court observed that given the “different market functions” served by 
the original copyrighted work and the parody version, it is “likely that the [parody] will 
not affect the market for the original in a way cognizable under [the fourth fair use] 
factor.” Id. That was the situation in Campbell. See id. at 593. See also Netanel, First 
Amendment Constraints, supra note 209, at 1111 (characterizing Campbell’s approach to 
the fourth fair use factor as a repudiation of the market-centered approach in Harper & 
Row). 
272 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 590, 592–93. 
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others to develop.”273 Justice Souter stressed in Campbell that 
“there is no protectible derivative market for criticism [because] 
the unlikelihood that creators of imaginative works will license crit-
ical reviews or lampoons of their own productions removes such 
uses from the very notion of a potential licensing market.”274 Ac-
cordingly, the defendants could not be treated as having harmed a 
potential market for “Oh, Pretty Woman” parodies, because a 
supposed market of that sort would not be a logical one.275 There 
was, however, a potential market that 2 Live Crew might have im-
paired: the market for rap versions of “Oh, Pretty Woman.” With 
the evidentiary record not providing a basis for determining wheth-
er such impairment had occurred or was likely, the Court re-
manded for further consideration of that question.276 
The remand ordered by the Court meant that Campbell was not 
a flat-out win for the defendants, but Justice Souter’s opinion was a 
favorable one for parodists and for other defendants who seek the 
protection of the fair use doctrine. Campbell’s treatment of the fair 
use factors contemplated a far broader potential scope for the fair 
use defense than the Court had signaled nine years earlier in the 
Harper & Row decision.277 As will be seen, Campbell’s insights will 
play key roles in the fair use analysis proposed in this Article. The 
following section presents that analysis. 
III. THE FAIR USE DREAM: A PROPOSED ANALYSIS  
As previous discussion revealed, courts have not had occasion 
to determine whether particular unlicensed uses of the “I Have a 
Dream” speech may merit the fair use defense’s protection against 
copyright infringement liability. Courts that have ruled in in-
fringement cases dealing with the speech have focused on whether 
the required actions for securing copyright were taken under the 
                                                                                                                            
273 Id. at 592. 
274 Id. 
275 Id. 
276 Id. at 592–94. 
277 Compare id. at 578–94 (viewing fair use factors in light potentially favorable to 
defendants) with Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 561–69 
(1985) (applying fair use factors in manner considerably more favorable to copyright 
owner). For further discussion of Harper & Row, see supra Part II.B. 
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law in effect in 1963, without reaching possible fair use ques-
tions.278 Other cases have been settled, leaving fair use arguments 
unresolved. Moreover, it seems reasonable to conclude that as a 
likely effect of the King Estate’s approach to copyright enforce-
ment, those who want to use portions of the speech and may have 
had strong fair use arguments for doing so have tended to seek and 
pay for a license in order to eliminate the threat of being sued.279 
There are substantial fair use arguments to be made regarding 
many uses of the speech, but those arguments obviously will go 
nowhere unless a court is in position to rule on them. That will 
happen only if a user of part or all of “I Have a Dream” departs 
from the usual tendency to seek a license and refuses to yield in the 
face of infringement allegations. Perhaps the user would be a do-
cumentary filmmaker who includes much or all of the speech in the 
documentary and accompanies it with commentary, interviews, 
and historical footage. Perhaps the user would post full-text ver-
sions of the speech online, in an effort to inform and educate. The 
user might be a book publisher that prints the text of the speech 
and accompanies it with explanatory notes. Or the user could be 
one whose “I Still Have a Dream” speech borrows from the origi-
nal but adds content in an effort to consider the assessment Dr. 
King might offer, if he were alive today, of what we still need to do 
to realize the vision he set forth in the original speech. Other justi-
fiable uses can readily be envisioned. 
Any of the possible uses identified above would be likely to 
trigger a lawsuit in which the fair use defense would be potentially 
applicable. Alternatively, a declaratory judgment action by the user 
could be a route to a fair use ruling by a court, given the likelihood 
that the use would prompt an objection and a threat of litigation 
from the King Estate (thus creating a genuine controversy suitable 
for judicial resolution). The following subsections assume the exis-
tence of a case or cases in which the user of part or all of the “I 
Have a Dream” speech argues for fair use protection against in-
fringement liability. A court deciding such a case should approach 
                                                                                                                            
278 See supra Part II.A. 
279 See supra text accompanying notes 16–18, 120–21. Sometimes would-be users have 
simply abandoned the idea, as indicated in the previous discussion of the movie Selma. 
See supra text accompanying notes 122–24. 
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the fair use determination in a manner consistent with the analysis 
to be offered below. The analysis proceeds on a factor-by-factor 
basis, with other relevant considerations added along the way. 
A. The First Factor 
In a case involving an unlicensed use of “I Have a Dream,” the 
court would analyze the fair use issues by working through the sta-
tutorily required factors, the first of which deals with the purpose 
and character of the defendant’s use.280 As a reason for the court to 
resolve the first factor against the defendant, the King Estate surely 
would seek to highlight the profit motive that would be present in 
many uses of the speech. Such a point of emphasis would be un-
derstandable, considering the statute’s reference to “commercial” 
use in the factor-one language and the approach adopted by the 
Supreme Court in Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enter-
prises.281 There, as previous discussion revealed, the Court honed 
in on the commercial motivation that The Nation, a for-profit mag-
azine, would have had regarding its article that borrowed expres-
sion from the copyrighted, unpublished manuscript of President 
Ford’s memoirs. When it concluded that the first factor cut against 
fair use, the Harper & Row Court paid little attention to potentially 
offsetting purposes, such as news reporting, that also attended the 
publication of the article in The Nation.282 
The King Estate, however, would succeed with the above ar-
gument—and the court would take a Harper & Row-like approach 
to the first fair use factor—only if the court pays insufficient atten-
tion to three key matters: the relevant statutory language; the con-
text of Harper & Row; and the lessons the Supreme Court later 
provided in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.283 The following sub-
sections address those matters. 
1. The Statutory Language and the Harper & Row Context 
In setting forth the first fair use factor, Congress called for an 
inquiry into “the purpose and character of the use, including 
                                                                                                                            
280 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012). 
281 471 U.S. 539 (1985). 
282 Id. at 561–63. 
283 510 U.S. 569 (1994). 
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whether such use is or a commercial nature” or, instead, is of a 
“nonprofit educational” nature.284 The use of the word “includ-
ing” indicates that the commercial versus nonprofit educational 
question is only part of the factor-one inquiry. Other purposes may 
have an offsetting effect with regard to an underlying profit motive, 
and should also be taken into account under the first factor.285 
In doing little more than wave at any purpose other than a 
commercial motivation that was also present regarding the article 
in The Nation, Harper & Row did not conduct the true weighing and 
balancing contemplated by the statute. Justice O’Connor’s majori-
ty opinion in Harper & Row suggests that the Court’s narrow ap-
proach to factor number one and its pro-copyright-owner applica-
tion of the other fair use factors were influenced greatly by the con-
cern that the defendant’s magazine article usurped Harper & 
Row’s critical right of first publication. That concern permeated 
the Harper & Row decision,286 whose factual context, therefore, is 
significantly different from the context of any case involving an un-
licensed use of the “I Have a Dream” speech. 
The right of first publication issue that preoccupied the Court 
in Harper & Row stemmed from the fact that the Ford manuscript 
was an unpublished work as of the time the defendants borrowed 
from it. The former President’s memoirs had been kept confiden-
tial until someone surreptitiously provided a copy to an editor of 
The Nation.287 If that action had not taken place, there would have 
been no article in The Nation, and Harper & Row’s excerpts-
licensing plans would not have been disrupted.288 
The “I Have a Dream” speech, however, cannot credibly be 
considered an unpublished work, at least not in the same sense the 
Ford manuscript was. According to the courts that decided the 
previously discussed cases dealing with whether the speech carried 
copyright protection under the law in effect in 1963, the speech was 
not a published work as of the date of its delivery (August 28, 1963) 
because copies distributed that day were made available only to the 
                                                                                                                            
284 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012) (emphasis added). 
285 See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 578–85. 
286 See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 550–57, 561–64, 567. 
287 Id. at 542, 557. 
288 Id. at 557, 567–69. 
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press and because precedent cases indicated that the performance 
of a work (there, Dr. King’s delivery of the speech) did not consti-
tute a general publication.289 Though not published for purposes of 
the then-existing rules on copyright protection, the speech was 
“published” on August 28, 1963 in a different sense more relevant 
here: the sense of making it widely available to the public through 
delivery to the 200,000 or more people present at the scene and 
through the television coverage the organizers of the March on 
Washington invited and encouraged.290 Thus, unlike the Ford me-
moirs, the speech was anything but a confidential work being held 
under wraps until the copyright owner could begin implementing 
licensing plans. From the beginning, the speech was designed for 
widespread public consumption and, of course, broad public en-
lightenment. 
Moreover, as the above-mentioned cases reveal, the speech 
clearly became a published work in the conventional legal sense 
shortly after August 28, 1963, when Dr. King authorized the publi-
cation of the speech in certain books or other periodicals.291 Dec-
ades of copyright enforcement, including receipt of licensing fees, 
by the King Estate further demonstrate the impossibility that a de-
fendant’s use of the speech somehow could undermine a right of 
first publication.292 Accordingly, the right of first publication con-
cern that so animated the Court in Harper & Row is simply not 
present with regard to Dr. King’s speech. This strongly suggests 
that a court deciding a case regarding use of the speech should not 
ascribe a narrow, Harper & Row-influenced scope to the first fair 
use factor. The Harper & Row Court, in applying factor number 
one, paid special attention to the likelihood that the defendants 
made money as a result of their borrowing before the copyright 
owner could implement its plans to exploit the work in a financial 
                                                                                                                            
289 King v. Mister Maestro, Inc., 224 F. Supp. 101, 106–08 (S.D.N.Y. 1963); Estate of 
Martin Luther King, Jr., Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 194 F.3d 1211, 1214–17, 1120 (11th Cir. 1999). 
Therefore, the courts ruled, Dr. King did not lose the common law copyright that the law 
then recognized regarding unpublished works. Mister Maestro, 224 F. Supp. at 104–05, 
106–08; CBS, 194 F.3d at 1220. For discussion of the two decisions, see supra Part I.A. 
290 Mister Maestro, 224 F. Supp. at 103–04, 106–08; CBS, 194 F.3d at 1213. 
291 Mister Maestro, 224 F. Supp. at 104–05, 106–08. 
292 See supra Part I.B. 
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sense.293 The very different facts surrounding an unlicensed use of 
“I Have a Dream” would not support similar special emphasis on 
the defendant’s profit motive as a reason to deny the defendant the 
protection of the fair use defense. 
2. Lessons from Campbell 
The lessons provided by Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.294 
further support the foregoing analysis. One of these lessons, in-
cluded in the Court’s explanation of the role of a defendant’s 
commercial motivation in the factor-one analysis, offered a re-
minder that many borrowings from copyrighted works are tied to a 
profit-seeking activity in some sense. The Court observed that “[i]f 
commerciality carried presumptive force against a finding of fair-
ness, the presumption would swallow nearly all of the illustrative 
uses listed in § 107, including news reporting, comment, criticism, 
teaching, scholarship, and research, since these activities ‘are gen-
erally conducted for profit in this country.’”295 The Court thus 
emphasized that a defendant’s profit motive, though relevant, is 
only one consideration in the factor-one analysis called for by 
§ 107.296 Justice Souter also explained that the weight ascribed to 
the defendant’s commercial motivation in the fair use analysis will 
vary from case to case, depending upon other considerations that 
may be in play.297 
Campbell thus made plain that when courts consider the pur-
pose and character of the defendant’s use of the copyrighted work, 
a weighing and balancing is in order. If the use reflects purposes 
valued under the fair use doctrine, those purposes may, in appro-
priate instances, offset or even outweigh the defendant’s profit mo-
tive.298 Campbell also emphasized the highly valued status of trans-
formative uses—uses that borrow from the copyrighted work but 
                                                                                                                            
293 See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 542, 564, 566–67. 
294 510 U.S. 569 (1994). 
295 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 584 (quoting Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 592 (Brennan, J. 
dissenting)); see also 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012). 
296 510 U.S. at 583–85. 
297 Id. at 585. 
298 Id. at 584–85; see also id. at 578–79; 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012); see also Samuelson, supra 
note 162, at 2549–87 (discussing numerous examples of cases dealing with purposes that 
may offset commercial motivation). 
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add something new in order to further a purpose beyond what the 
borrowed-from work possessed. The Court observed that the more 
transformative the use, the less concern there should be about the 
commercial aspects of the defendant’s use.299 But even though 
Campbell indicated that transformative uses lie at the core of the 
fair use doctrine, Justice Souter noted that fair use protection may 
apply even when a transformative character is not present.300 
3. Application to Uses of “I Have a Dream” 
The weighing and balancing contemplated by the first fair use 
factor, as envisioned in Campbell, allows ample room for unlicensed 
users of the “I Have a Dream” speech to stress considerations that 
should cause the first fair use factor to point in their favor. Many 
uses of the speech would have a clear educational character. For 
instance, showing a film of the speech—even the entire speech—in 
a school setting should be a prime fair use candidate for purposes of 
factor number one, because the use would be for nonprofit educa-
tional purposes.301 Some school-related uses of this sort presuma-
bly have occurred, but without threats of legal action because the 
King Estate did not know about them, chose not to object to them, 
or perhaps even licensed them.302 But it seems reasonable to expect 
that cautious school administrators may not be inclined to make a 
use of the speech and then defend it on fair use grounds because 
they could perceive doing so as far riskier than it would actually 
be.303 Schools should have considerable borrowing and use latitude 
regarding “I Have a Dream.” 
Educational uses, moreover, may extend well beyond the for-
mal school setting. Various other uses, such as the previously noted 
                                                                                                                            
299 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579. 
300 Id. Some uses that are not transformative may still benefit the public and should 
therefore be candidates for fair use protection despite being non-transformative. Rebecca 
Tushnet, Copy This Essay: How Fair Use Doctrine Harms Free Speech and How Copying 
Serves It, 114 YALE L.J. 535, 537–38, 545, 556, 586 (2004). 
301 See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012). Separate statutory protection could also apply to some 
video showings in the classroom. See supra note 98. 
302 Strauss, supra note 3; see also Strauss, King’s Fiery Speech Rarely Heard, supra note 
18. 
303 Although many school-related uses should be good candidates for fair use protection, 
the fact-specific, case-by-case nature of the fair use analysis does not provide the clarity a 
school administrator might like before making a decision on whether to use the speech. 
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uses in documentaries, books, and online forums, would have 
strong arguments that they are educational in nature.304 Just as in 
the school environment, such uses’ educational character would be 
enhanced considerably if the “I Have a Dream” snippets we typi-
cally see or hear could be placed in the context of the full speech, or 
at least a good bit more of the speech than the public usually en-
counters. Of course, educational uses of the sort noted here proba-
bly would not be nonprofit in nature. The fact of a profit motive, 
however, clearly does not deprive a user of the ability to seek fair 
use protection. Campbell offered useful reminders that many, if not 
most, uses of copyrighted works have some sort of profit motive 
underlying them and that a use’s commercial character may be off-
set or outweighed by other important purposes.305 Many uses’ 
strong educational character should carry significant weight when 
considered alongside the profit motive the copyright owner would 
like to stress in the fair use analysis. 
So should the commentary that would be part of certain uses of 
the “I Have a Dream” speech. For instance, a documentary film-
maker might accompany footage of most or all of the speech with 
interviews in which civil rights leaders or historians comment on 
the speech, its messages, and its implications. A book publisher 
might do a similar thing, printing the full text of the speech in a vo-
lume that includes analysis of, and commentary on, the speech. 
CBS produced such a documentary along those lines more than 
twenty-five years ago and was hit with one of the infringement law-
suits discussed earlier.306 The court ruled only on the copyright 
qualification issues surrounding the speech and did not reach 
CBS’s fair use arguments in a case that the parties later settled.307 
If the court had addressed the fair use issues and had adopted the 
approach urged here, CBS would have been treated favorably in the 
                                                                                                                            
304 See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012); see also Samuelson, supra note 162, at 2580–87 
(discussing uses that promote learning). 
305 See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579, 584–85. 
306 Estate of Martin Luther King, Jr., Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 194 F.3d 1211 (11th Cir. 1999). 
For discussion of the case, see supra text accompanying notes 57–66. See also supra text 
accompanying notes 95–96 (discussing the King Estate’s dispute with the makers of the 
documentary Eyes on the Prize). 
307 See Volz, supra note 9; see also text accompanying notes 69–70. 
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factor-one weighing and balancing process308 because its documen-
tary contained commentary. Commentary is a potentially favored 
purpose singled out in the Copyright Act’s fair use section, as is an 
educational purpose.309 When combined, commentary and an edu-
cational purpose should be especially effective in outweighing an 
underlying profit motive for purposes of factor number one.310 
The examples noted above could also be fairly characterized as 
transformative in nature. They clearly would use the speech or bor-
row portions of it, but would be adding content in furtherance of an 
educational purpose and related objectives. As Campbell noted, the 
transformative character could serve to lessen or perhaps override 
the factor-one concern over a use’s commercial component.311 It 
                                                                                                                            
308 In a comment and note dealing with fair use issues in historical documentaries, 
Elizabeth High expresses the view that CBS would have had strong fair use arguments if 
the court had addressed them. Elizabeth High, Comment and Note, Holding History 
Hostage: Fair Use in the Context of Historical Documentary, 18 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. 
REV. 753, 777–80 (2009). Her article offers useful analysis and suggestions regarding the 
use of voluntary guidelines that balance the rights of copyright owners and the interests of 
documentary makers who wish to borrow from copyrighted works for purposes of their 
documentaries. See id. at 773–76. See also Schiller, supra note 9 (asserting in op-ed that use 
of sort made by CBS should be protected under fair use doctrine). 
309 See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012). Section 107’s reference to “criticism or comment” 
should not be interpreted as indicating that commentary on a copyrighted work must be 
negative in nature in order to be a purpose that carries meaningful weight in the fair use 
analysis. Although it is possible that some commentary on the “I Have a Dream” speech 
could be negative in nature, the speech’s wide acclaim as one of the greatest in modern 
times presumably would mean that commentary on it would nearly always be positive in 
nature. Much can be learned from commentary that addresses why the speech occupies 
such a rarified position or, say, explores the lessons the speech continues to offer more 
than five decades after its delivery. 
310 Of course, the Court in Harper & Row applied the first factor more narrowly than the 
application urged here when it concluded that the news reporting purpose stressed by The 
Nation was overwhelmed by the magazine’s supposed commercial purpose. See Harper & 
Row, 471 U.S. at 562–63. However, as explained earlier, Harper & Row’s restrictive 
approach to factor number one and the other fair use factor appears to have been 
influenced by the Court’s extreme concern over the defendants’ undermining of the 
copyright owner’s right of first publication. Such a concern would not be present with 
regard to uses of Dr. King’s speech. Moreover, Harper & Row’s negative attitude toward 
users’ profit motives appears to have been tempered by Campbell and its emphasis on 
purposes and considerations that, in the factor-one analysis, may outweigh profit motives. 
See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579–85. 
311 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579. The Court also suggested in Campbell that when a parody 
of, or other commentary on, a copyrighted work is used in an effort to sell a product, it 
may receive less favorable treatment in the factor-one analysis than when the parody or 
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could be argued, of course, that uses of “I Have a Dream” may not 
be truly transformative if their purpose is to educate in some broad 
sense, because education, along with providing enlightenment and 
offering inspiration, was probably one of Dr. King’s underlying 
purposes in delivering the speech.312 Yet the education and enligh-
tenment purposes of today’s uses of the speech would add a differ-
ent dimension by exposing those born since 1963 to the speech in 
its full context, by viewing the speech through the lens of history, 
and by enabling an assessment of how far we have come over the 
past five decades and of how far we still have to go in achieving the 
vision Dr. King offered in the speech. That different dimension 
merits meaningful consideration under factor number one. 
Some uses of the speech would not add content at all. Suppose, 
for instance, that a user prints and distributes full-text copies of the 
speech or that an organization publicly airs footage of the speech. 
Because neither use would add new content to the speech or the 
portions borrowed from it, such uses might not be regarded as 
transformative.313 Even so, educational purposes and related objec-
tives could still be present and furthered. Say that the public airing 
of the speech is then followed by a discussion session dealing with 
issues raised in the speech. Although a discussion session of that 
sort would not change the speech’s content in any way, important 
public interest considerations would be advanced through use of 
the speech. It is also important to remember Campbell’s statement 
that a transformative character is “not absolutely necessary” for 
                                                                                                                            
other commentary is itself being sold. Id. at 585. In uses of the sort being addressed here, 
users of the “I Have a Dream” speech would not be using the speech to sell a product 
such as a beverage, a sleep aid, or an automobile. Rather, the user’s profit motive would 
be tied to the communication of the speech’s content. According to the Campbell 
suggestion, then, such a profit motive should not necessarily be cause for concern under 
the first fair use factor. A similar distinction between speech used to sell a product and 
speech itself being sold operates in the First Amendment arena. The former, illustrated 
by an advertisement for motorcycles, is less-protected commercial speech, whereas the 
latter, illustrated by a movie or book, is fully protected noncommercial speech despite the 
underlying profit motives. See supra note 209. 
312 The argument would be that, according to Campbell, a transformative use “adds 
something new, with a further purpose or different character.” Id. at 579 (emphasis 
added). Such an argument involves too restrictive a reading of the quoted language. 
313 See id. 
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fair use protection to be triggered.314 Where important public inter-
ests are at stake, the lack of transformative character in a use 
should not doom fair use arguments to failure. 
In evaluating the purpose and character of uses of “I Have a 
Dream,” courts should take account of the speech’s unique signi-
ficance. As will be seen, this significance relates not only to the first 
fair use factor but also to the second. Not simply an interesting 
speech, “I Have a Dream” is widely regarded as a masterpiece of 
oratory.315 Even more importantly for fair use purposes, it has spe-
cial social and political resonance. The delivery of the speech was a 
critical component of the landmark March on Washington events 
and became a profoundly important event in the civil rights move-
ment.316 A student—whether still in school or in lifelong learning 
mode—cannot fully understand the civil rights movement and re-
lated US history without a suitable familiarity with the speech and 
the issues it raises. Acquisition of that familiarity would seem far 
more likely to be developed through exposure to the full speech 
than merely to the snippets usually made available. Exposure of the 
public to most or all of the speech can be guaranteed, however, on-
ly if a meaningfully expansive approach to fair use is recognized. 
Leaving such exposure purely up to the copyright owner means 
that it will occur only upon payment of a large licensing fee, if it is 
allowed to occur at all. 
Similarly, the speech’s authorship and delivery by a giant in the 
civil rights arena and in US history more broadly give the speech a 
special significance. Dr. King won the Nobel Peace Prize. He is the 
only non-President recognized with a federal holiday. A monument 
commemorating his life and work appears on the National Mall in 
Washington, D.C. The need for meaningful public access to one of 
his most important works—and to what may be learned from it—
would seem an especially important consideration in the fair use 
analysis. 
The above emphasis on the special significance of the “I Have 
a Dream” speech and on Dr. King’s towering status in American 
                                                                                                                            
314 Id.; see Tushnet, supra note 300, at 537–38, 545. 
315 See, e.g., Katukani, supra note 3; Strauss, supra note 3. 
316 See supra text accompanying notes 1–5, 31–32. 
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history would seem to run contrary to Harper & Row’s statement to 
the effect that public figures’ copyrighted works should not receive 
less protection than other copyrighted works.317 That Harper & 
Row statement, however, came in the context of a case in which the 
Court found highly troublesome the fact that the copyright owner 
was deprived of the especially important right of first publica-
tion.318 It seems reasonable to conclude that regardless of whether 
the creator of a copyrighted work was a public figure or, instead a 
private figure, the same ability to exploit the right of first publica-
tion should be extended to the copyright owner. As previous dis-
cussion established, no compromising of the right of first publica-
tion occurred with regard to the “I Have a Dream” speech, and, 
obviously, the copyright owner has exercised publication rights for 
more than fifty years. When considered in light of Harper & Row’s 
context, the Court’s statement about public figures’ copyrighted 
works does not and should not bar the fair use analysis advocated 
here. 
Moreover, this Article’s proposed analysis does not feature a 
categorical approach to treatment of public figures’ copyrighted 
works.319 But neither does the proposed analysis ignore the special 
status and importance of Dr. King and his speech. Taking such 
considerations into account, as this Article’s proposal does, is in 
keeping with the fact-specific, case-by-case nature of fair use analy-
sis. 
B. The Second Factor 
In moving to the second factor, the nature of the copyrighted 
work,320 a further nod to Campbell is in order. Justice Souter noted 
there that in discussing the second factor, courts have tended to 
                                                                                                                            
317 Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 557 (1985). 
318 See supra text accompanying notes 286–88. 
319 A categorical approach is taken in the law of defamation, for First Amendment 
reasons. In order to win a defamation case, a public official or public figure plaintiff must 
prove that the defendant made the false statement with actual malice (knowledge of 
falsity or reckless disregard for the truth). New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 
279–80 (1964). A comparable public figure rule is not necessary in the copyright realm, 
though the public figure status of certain works’ creators may bear directly on the public 
interest and on the historic significance of the work. 
320 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012). 
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articulate a distinction between highly creative works and largely 
factual works whose content (not only facts but also expression) is 
designed for widespread public consumption.321 Under this distinc-
tion, factor two may be less likely to cut in favor of fair use if the 
borrowed-from copyrighted work was in the highly creative catego-
ry.322 Seeming to acknowledge that this distinction ultimately car-
ries little weight in the fair use analysis, the Court stated in Camp-
bell that at least in cases involving parody, the distinction is not par-
ticularly helpful in distinguishing “the fair use sheep from the in-
fringing goats.”323 
The Campbell acknowledgment seems appropriate beyond the 
parody setting and, in particular, in the types of case with which 
this Article is concerned. The “I Have a Dream” speech was ob-
viously a highly creative work with powerful, artistic, and inspiring 
expression, but its forward-looking vision was also grounded in past 
and present facts. Moreover, Dr. King and leaders of the March on 
Washington clearly meant for widespread public consumption of 
the speech to occur, given the huge throng in attendance on the 
date of its delivery and the extensive media coverage that was 
sought. Thus, as the Court observed in Campbell, the factor-two 
distinction courts traditionally voice offers essentially no help in 
determining whether a use of the “I Have a Dream” speech 
amounts to a fair use sheep or an infringing goat.324 
After Harper & Row’s previously discussed emphasis on the po-
tentially problematic nature of borrowing from an unpublished 
work and then compromising the copyright owner’s right of first 
publication,325 the unpublished versus published distinction has 
become a component of the factor-two inquiry. If the defendant 
borrowed from an unpublished work, then the second factor is un-
likely to favor a finding of fair use. If the borrowing was from a pub-
lished work, the second factor tends to hold little significance in the 
                                                                                                                            
321 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 586 (1994). 
322 E.g., Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley, Ltd., 448 F.3d 605, 612 (2d Cir. 
2006). 
323 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 586. 
324 See id.; Bill Graham Archives, 448 F.3d at 612. 
325 See supra text accompanying notes 286–88. 
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analysis.326 “I Have a Dream” has long been a published work, so 
any borrowing from or use of the speech would not trigger the con-
cern expressed in Harper & Row and would not cause the second 
factor to cut against fair use. 
For purposes of this Article’s proposed fair use analysis, some 
of what was advocated above regarding the first fair use factor also 
applies to the second factor. When courts deciding cases involving 
uses of “I Have a Dream” consider the nature of the copyrighted 
work, they should not ignore the setting, fame, visibility, and im-
portance of this speech by a legendary and highly influential leader. 
The speech’s fame would seem to surpass otherwise noteworthy 
addresses by US Presidents, with perhaps only inaugural addresses 
by Franklin Delano Roosevelt and John F. Kennedy matching Dr. 
King’s speech in terms of recognition of a key phrase. (Consider 
FDR’s “The only thing we have to fear …”; JFK’s “Ask not what 
your country can do for you …”; and MLK’s “I have a 
dream ….”) Presidential speeches, of course, would normally be 
classified as government-authored works and therefore ineligible 
for copyright protection,327 whereas Dr. King’s speech was eligible 
and remains under that protection. Yet taking into account the 
speech’s degree of fame seems especially apt in the fair use analy-
sis, considering its case-by-case nature.328 
Fame, however, does not necessarily translate into full under-
standing. The “I Have a Dream” speech may seem familiar be-
cause we have all seen brief clips containing the “I have a dream” 
line, but the public’s familiarity with the speech may not go much 
deeper. Adopting a fair use analysis that gives meaningful oppor-
tunities for use of more than merely brief clips can lead to greater 
understanding on the part of the public about what the speech con-
tained and what its content may mean for our society as the years 
and generations pass. This recognition also relates to the third fair 
use factor, to which the analysis now turns. 
                                                                                                                            
326 See Bill Graham Archives, 448 F.3d at 612. 
327 17 U.S.C. § 105 (2012). 
328 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 577. 
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C. The Third Factor 
Previous discussion revealed that the greater the degree of bor-
rowing in either a quantitative or qualitative sense, the less likely it 
is that that the third factor will point toward fair use. Conversely, 
lesser degrees of borrowing may enhance the defendant’s factor-
three argument.329 The statutory section dealing with fair use con-
templates, however, that under appropriate circumstances, even 
the borrowing of an entire copyrighted work may still be protected 
by the fair use defense. Section 107 states, for instance, that distri-
buting “multiple copies for classroom use” could be a fair use can-
didate.330 
Campbell, moreover, provided a further message of importance 
here: The extent of the borrowing must be considered in light of 
the purposes furthered by the defendant’s use.331 Properly heeding 
the Campbell message and the content and thrust of the § 107 lan-
guage requires careful consideration of the matchup between the 
purposes underlying defendants’ uses of the “I Have a Dream” 
speech and the extent of the borrowing. Considering the previously 
noted educational, commentary, and public interest purposes re-
flected in many uses of the speech, borrowing significant portions 
of the speech or even all of it may be in line with those purposes. 
Snippets cannot provide the illuminating effect that the speech’s 
further content can provide. Just as the parodist may sometimes 
need special latitude to borrow from the commented-on copy-
righted work,332 so, too, may the borrower from a work of great his-
torical significance need special latitude in that regard in order to 
accomplish important educational and public interest objectives. 
D. The Fourth Factor 
This factor, of course, focuses on whether the defendant’s use 
of the copyrighted work adversely affected markets for the work.333 
The test here is not merely whether the copyright owner would like 
to collect a licensing fee, for if it were the test, there would invaria-
                                                                                                                            
329 See supra text accompanying notes 179–83. 
330 17 U.S.C. § 107. 
331 See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 586. 
332 Id. at 588–89. 
333 17 U.S.C. § 107. 
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bly be an adverse effect on a market every time an unlicensed use 
was made. Instead, the factor-four inquiry considers only those log-
ical markets that the copyright owner could reasonably pursue and 
expect to exploit.334 
Cases indicate that if the defendant made a transformative use, 
there generally should be no assumption that impairment of a rea-
sonable market occurred. The reasoning is that any market for 
transformative uses is not within the range of markets that logically 
do or should belong to the copyright owner.335 In a case of parody 
or critical commentary, it seems easier to conclude that the copy-
right owner would not be seeking to utilize a market for such uses 
and thus should not be able to create a factor-four market by simply 
asserting that the defendant’s failure to pay a licensing fee consti-
tutes impairment.336 Uses of the “I Have a Dream” speech, how-
ever, are unlikely to involve parody or other criticism of the speech. 
Instead, even some transformative uses of the speech, such as the 
previously noted example of use as part of a documentary, might be 
seen as arguably reasonable markets for the King Estate to pursue. 
And clearly the Estate has pursued such users, insisting on licens-
ing fees and sometimes suing for infringement.337 
Two questions therefore arise. First, should the rare parodist 
who would borrow from Dr. King’s speech somehow have a great-
er chance of succeeding with the fair use defense than the user who 
is clearly not a parodist but seeks to educate and inform? The an-
swer offered here is “no,” with any evening-up of the chances be-
ing accomplished through increasing the latter user’s chances of 
attaining fair use protection, not by diminishing the parodist’s 
chances in that regard. The second question is whether the King 
Estate should have sweeping control regarding uses of this pro-
foundly significant speech, considering the important purposes un-
derlying uses of it and the additional decades that the copyright on 
the speech will last. This question leads to the following subsec-
tion’s focus on public interest considerations in light of the lengthy 
duration of the copyright on the speech. 
                                                                                                                            
334 Bill Graham Archives, 448 F.3d at 613–15. 
335 Id.; see Campbell, 510 U.S. at 591–92. 
336 See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 591–92. 
337 See supra Part I.B. 
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E. The Public Interest Consideration and the Copyright Duration 
Problem 
The list of fair use factors enumerated in § 107 of the Copyright 
Act does not preclude a court from taking other considerations into 
account in conducting the case-by-case fair use analysis.338 The 
public interest is one such consideration,339 and one that should 
assume particular significance in the context of uses of historic co-
pyrighted works such as the “I Have a Dream” speech. 
Earlier portions of the analysis proposed here have made refer-
ence to public interest purposes because they have logical connec-
tions with educational purposes and related objectives taken into 
account under fair use factor number one.340 In recognizing the fair 
use defense, courts and Congress have concluded that giving the 
copyright owner exclusive control of all decisions on use of the re-
levant copyrighted work may sometimes lead to undesirable re-
sults. When the copyright owner’s exertion of control over the 
work would stifle creativity or would otherwise impede sufficiently 
important purposes that users of the work would seek to further, 
the fair use doctrine may come into play.341 Consideration of the 
public interest can help inform courts’ decisions on whether the 
user’s purposes are sufficiently important to justify the fair use 
doctrine’s limitation on the copyright owner’s usual rights.342 Ex-
plicit attention to the public interest in the fair use analysis thus 
would permit an inquiry into whether, despite the copyrighted na-
ture of the relevant work, the public should effectively be a stake-
holder in regard to decisions on certain uses of it. 
Given the historic and enduring significance of the “I Have a 
Dream” speech, fair use determinations concerning uses of the 
speech should take into account what is, or is not, in the public in-
                                                                                                                            
338 ABRAMS, supra note 161, § 15:32. 
339 E.g., Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1168 (9th Cir. 2006); 
Time, Inc. v. Bernard Geis Assocs., 293 F. Supp. 130, 146 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). 
340 See supra Part III.A. 
341 Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 236 (1990); Campbell, 510 U.S. at 577. 
342 See Perfect 10, 508 F.3d at 1168. There, the court took the public interest into account 
in deciding that Google should be protected under the fair use doctrine when, in reporting 
search results, it included thumbnail-sized images of the plaintiffs’ copyrighted photos. 
Id. Holding Google liable might have had the effect of limiting the effectiveness of search 
engines—a result that probably would not be in the public interest. See id. 
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terest. The importance of doing so becomes even more apparent 
when one considers the length of time copyrights last. As previous 
discussion has revealed, the copyright on the “I Have a Dream” 
speech qualified for the lengthy extensions of copyright duration 
that Congress enacted in the mid-1970s and late-1990s. The copy-
right concerning which Dr. King would have expected a maximum 
of fifty-six years of protection has become, therefore, a ninety-five-
year bundle of rights.343 Under the law in effect in 1963 and until 
the mid-1970s, the copyright on the speech would have expired at 
the end of 2019, but will now continue to exist for almost forty 
years beyond that.344 
Of course, the opportunity to obtain copyright rights can pro-
vide important incentives to engage in creative activity.345 The fact 
that Dr. King pursued copyright protection for the “I Have a 
Dream” speech indicates that securing copyright protection was 
important to him, but the social causes to which he devoted his life 
suggest strongly that incentives and influences other than those 
connected with copyright were far more important reasons why he 
wrote and delivered the speech.346 Even assuming, however, that 
the prospect of fifty-six years of copyright protection was a signifi-
cant incentive for the writing of the speech, the decades of addi-
tional years of protection tacked on by Congress in its copyright 
duration extensions cannot have created an incentive to create a 
work that had already been created. Although the Supreme Court 
rejected such a lack-of-incentives argument in sustaining the 1998 
Copyright Term Extension Act against constitutional attack in El-
dred v. Ashcroft,347 nothing in Eldred prohibits courts from taking 
                                                                                                                            
343 See supra Part I.C. 
344 See id. 
345 Leval, supra note 15, at 1107–08; see Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation 
Enters. 471 U.S. 539, 546 (1985). 
346 See Khanna, supra note 20, at 76; see generally Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Inspiration 
and Innovation: The Intrinsic Dimension of the Artistic Soul, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1945 
(2006) (exploring other reasons—besides economic incentives—why artists engage in 
creative activity). 
347 537 U.S. 186 (2003). The Court held in Eldred that the duration extension did not 
violate Article I, § 8 of the Constitution. Id. at 208–19. For purposes of Article I, § 8’s 
preamble language, it did not matter that the duration extension could not possibly 
furnish an incentive to create works that had already been created. It was sufficient that 
the copyright regime in general furnished incentives to create. Id. at 211–12. Neither did 
1002 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.[Vol. XXV:939 
 
into account the effects of duration extensions when evaluating fair 
use arguments. With regard to the “I Have a Dream” speech, a 
major effect is the handcuffing of would-be users of the speech 
through 2058, thirty-nine years beyond the period of copyright pro-
tection contemplated by the law in effect when copyright on the 
speech came into being.348 Worthwhile uses of the speech stand to 
be stifled for decades to come, with demands for licensing fees con-
tinuing unabated, unless courts faced with deciding fair use issues 
take meaningful stock of what is in the public interest. 
Of course, a court cannot rule that a particular copyright is no 
longer entitled to the full statutory duration set by Congress. How-
ever, a fair use analysis that duly recognizes the public interest can 
appropriately limit copyright owners’ excesses and provide case-
by-case reprieves from the unintended negative consequences of 
the congressional decisions to make copyrights longer and longer in 
duration. The duration extensions have created considerable pri-
vate benefit for copyright owners and considerable harm to the 
public interest in the sense that dates when works would enter into 
the public domain are put off until much farther down the road.349 
Even though courts cannot move up the date when works enter the 
public domain and become fully available for all to use, they can 
ameliorate the duration-extension-related harm by taking the public 
interest into account when making fair use determinations. 
F. Application to Other Historic Works 
This Article’s analysis has focused on uses of the “I Have a 
Dream” speech, but the fair use proposals offered here can apply 
readily to other works of a similarly historic nature. To be “similar-
ly historic” for purposes of the Article’s proposals, the work must 
                                                                                                                            
the duration extension violate the First Amendment. Id. at 218–22. Although the Court 
upheld the duration extension, it suggested that its enactment may not have been wise 
public policy. See id. at 208. For extensive analysis of Eldred and examination of the 
problems created by the duration extension, see Arlen W. Langvardt and Kyle T. 
Langvardt, supra note 141, at 236–92. See also Khanna, supra note 20, at 70–104 
(lamenting the harmful effects of copyright durations that have become overly long). 
348 See supra Part I.C.; see also Khanna, supra note 20, at 76 (observing that because of 
very long copyright durations, “[g]enerations of . . . historical artifacts now lay fallow 
behind locked vaults of copyright”). 
349 See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 247–55 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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not simply have been about important persons or matters in histo-
ry. Rather, the work must have been created by a person of pro-
found historical importance in a public policy sense or must consist 
predominantly of the words of such a person even if he or she did 
not create the work.350 The work must also be of a non-fiction na-
ture, whether autobiographical or expressive of views on political, 
social, or cultural issues.351 In addition to these requirements, the 
work must be a published work. These requirements suitably nar-
row the range of works subject to the potentially more expansive 
fair use analysis proposed here and avoid the right of first publica-
tion problem that dominated the Harper & Row decision.352 
It may be helpful to provide examples of copyrighted works that 
would satisfy the test outlined above and, like the “I Have a 
Dream” speech, should trigger the type of fair use analysis pro-
posed here when infringement litigation arises from third parties’ 
unlicensed uses of those works. Of course, other major works of 
Dr. King could meet the test.353 Works authored by Presidents of 
the United States or other high-level government officials prior to 
or after their time in office would also satisfy the test. (Speeches, 
other addresses, and official statements they created—or whose 
creation they oversaw—while in office need not be considered 
here, because they would be classified as government-authored 
                                                                                                                            
350 Thus, a historian’s biography of a famous person would not be subject to the more 
expansive fair use analysis proposed here. Though it is about a famous person, the 
biography would not consist predominantly of the famous person’s words. 
351 The analysis proposed here does not amount to a public-figure exception to general 
copyright principles. The limitations just outlined would rule out many works authored by 
public figures, such as works of fiction or other creations by celebrities, however 
entertaining, interesting, or otherwise important they may be, if those creations do not 
reflect the type of content noted in the text. A categorical public-figure rule of the sort 
required in the defamation context—see supra note 319—would be unwarranted in the fair 
use setting, but the fact-specific, case-by-case nature of the fair use inquiry suggests that 
the public-figure status of a borrowed-from work’s author will sometimes be quite 
relevant. The exclusion of fiction narrows the range of works to which the more expansive 
fair use analysis outlined here would apply. Even the well-known writer of fiction typically 
is not in the public limelight to the same extent as the high-profile persons contemplated 
here. 
352 See supra text accompanying notes 286–88. 
353 Likely examples would include his “Letters from a Birmingham Jail,” his speech in 
Memphis shortly before his assassination, and selected sermons, assuming that copyright 
protection had attached to those works under the legal requirements in effect at the 
relevant times. 
1004 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.[Vol. XXV:939 
 
works and therefore not subject to copyright protection.)354 Presi-
dent Obama’s pre-presidential book Dreams from My Father and his 
Red State/Blue State address at the 2004 Democratic Convention 
would therefore qualify. So would the published memoirs of ex-
Presidents355 and presumably former Supreme Court Justices, ex-
Senate majority leaders, former Cabinet members, and the like. 
The same may be true of certain pre-election books of the sort that 
candidates for high-profile office tend to produce, seemingly on 
cue, as they launch their electoral campaigns. 
Examples may come from the private sector as well, if the 
works at issue reflect significant connections with major social is-
sues or matters of public policy. Depending upon the relevant facts, 
a book or op-ed article by, say, Warren Buffett, Bill Gates, or Oprah 
Winfrey might qualify. Moreover, as previously noted, the test 
could be met by works that consist largely of the words of the 
prominent speaker even if he or she did not create the work. Con-
sider, for example, a televised interview such as Walter Cronkite’s 
lengthy question-and-answer session with President Kennedy sev-
eral weeks before the JFK assassination, or a magazine interview of 
the private-sector figures noted earlier in this paragraph. What 
about television networks’ footage of the “I Have a Dream” 
speech? The footage may be the networks’ property, but it consists 
largely of Dr. King’s words. If, as is urged here, the public should 
have an expanded ability to borrow from or otherwise use the 
speech under the fair use doctrine, the same may be said regarding 
the footage of that speech.356 
It is important to keep in mind what is not being asserted here. 
The Article’s focus on the “I Have a Dream” speech and its out-
lining of the examples noted immediately above are not meant to 
suggest that courts should declare open season on works that quali-
fy for the approach advocated here and effect a de facto extinguish-
                                                                                                                            
354 See 17 U.S.C. § 305 (2012). 
355 The Ford memoirs, unpublished as of the time The Nation magazine engaged in the 
borrowing that gave rise to Harper & Row, would now be the type of work contemplated 
here because the memoirs have long been published. 
356 Other profoundly important historical footage displaying facts, such as the Zapruder 
film of the JFK assassination, could warrant an expansive fair use analysis similar to what 
is proposed here. 
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ing of the relevant copyrights by permitting any and all uses of 
those works. Rather, the analysis proposed here is designed to al-
low expanded room for consideration, within the copyright struc-
ture, of the public interest regarding use of such works. The fair 
use doctrine and its case-by-case nature are part of the copyright 
structure.357 If properly applied and interpreted, that structure can 
respect both the rights of the copyright owner and the legitimate 
rights and interests of the public. 
CONCLUSION 
The “I Have a Dream” speech is one of the most important in 
modern history, if not of all time. However, its copyrighted status 
and an active licensing and enforcement approach taken by its cop-
yright owner have resulted in only snippets of the speech being 
available for use unless the user is inclined to pay a significant li-
censing fee. As a result, opportunities to further important educa-
tional and public policy-related purposes go largely unrealized. The 
problem has been exacerbated by two copyright duration exten-
sions enacted by Congress. Those extensions, as applied to the 
speech, have transformed a copyright originally set to expire at the 
end of 2019 into a copyright that will exist until the end of 2058. 
If it is given an appropriate scope by courts, the fair use doc-
trine affords the potential for greater public access to the speech 
and greater ability to use the speech in furtherance of important 
objectives associated with the public interest. Courts thus far have 
not had occasion to rule on fair use arguments in infringement cas-
es involving unlicensed uses of the speech. The proposals offered 
above serve as a roadmap for courts to use in applying the fair use 
doctrine when such cases arise. The roadmap is applicable not only 
to uses of “I Have a Dream” but also to uses of other works that 
are similarly historic under the definition set forth herein (pub-
lished non-fiction works authored by a person of considerable his-
torical significance or consisting largely of the words of such a per-
son). It respects the rights of copyright owners but envisions a fair 
                                                                                                                            
357 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577 (1994). 
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use doctrine that is expansive enough to recognize, in appropriate 
instances, meaningful rights on the part of the public. 
 
